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UNRAVELING ROBINSON V. ARIYOSHI: CAN COURTS
"TAKE" PROPERTY?
Williamson B. C. Chang*
"We are not final because we are infallible, but we
are infallible only because we are final."**
The most critical question currently affecting Hawaii's state judicial
system is its relationship with the federal district courts of Hawaii. Deci-
sions of the Hawaii Supreme Court have been set aside by federal district
courts on three occasions in the 1970's.1 This pattern of nullification is of
obvious importance to the independence and sovereignty of the state ju-
diciary.' In particular, if the United States district court decision in
Robinson v. Ariyoshi is sustained on appeal, then the state supreme
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court will have been deprived of the ability to perform its principal re-
sponsibility; that is, to resolve questions of state law with finality. The
logic of Robinson v. Ariyoshi allows district court review and invalidation
of a state judicial decision that modifies or overrules prior state law in a
manner judged "unexpected" by the federal court. The ramifications of
this type of collateral attack are so great as to completely reorder our
system of federalism.
First, the United States Supreme Court would no longer perform its
role, clearly set forth by statute," as the exclusive appellate court for state
judgments. Under the district court's logic in Robinson, a reordering of
the parties 5 and an allegation that a judicial decision "took" private prop-
erty' suffices to create federal question jurisdiction, allowing a federal dis-
trict court to negate a state trial court judgment or appellate decision.7
Moreover, since the court in Robinson failed to articulate clear rules as to
what is an "unexpected" state ruling,8 federal intervention may be based
on the subjective judgment of the district court that a state court went
too far.
Second, state court decisions would be deprived of the preeminent re-
quirement of finality. If the Robinson type of collateral attack is allowed,
there will be two methods of reviewing state court decisions: appeal and
writ to the United States Supreme Court9 or collateral attack in the fed-
eral district courts. Under certiorari or appeal to the Supreme Court
there is a statutory time bar that renders the state supreme court judg-
1978). As of January 1980, the judgment in Sotomura v. County of Hawaii, 460 F. Supp. 473
(D. Hawaii 1978), had not been entered, but the government is likely to appeal that case as
well. For a description of the issues involved in Sotomura, see Callies, Land Use: Herein of
Vested Rights, Plans, and the Relationship of Planning and Controls, 2 U. HAWAII L. REv.
167 (1979).
4 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1976).
1 In the original state court action, the plaintiff was the McBryde Sugar Company, the
owner of the ilis kupono of Eleele and Kuiloa, situated in the southeastern portion of the
Hanapepe Valley. The defendants were (1) the territory, now the State of Hawaii, the owner
of the ahupua'a of Hanapepe, located in the southwestern portion of the valley, (2) the
partnership of Gay & Robinson and its individual partners, owners of the ilis kupono of
Manuahi and Koula, located in the northwestern and northeastern portions of the valley,
and (3) the small owners, owners of all other lands in the valley.
In the federal district court action, the plaintiffs were the Robinson family, and the de-
fendants included (1) State officials, (2) McBryde and Olokele Sugar Companies, and (3) the
small owners. On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the Robinsons, Olokele, McBryde, and the
small farmers all argued as appellees. In other words, they supported affirmance of the dis-
trict court opinion.
6 441 F. Supp. at 562, 580.
" Id. at 586.
8 Id. at 583: "McBryde I therefore came as a shocking, violent deviation from the solidly
established case law-totally unexpected and impossible to have been anticipated. It was a
radical departure from prior decisions." The court referred to the original decision and the
supreme court's opinion on rehearing as McBryde I and McBryde II, respectively. See text
accompanying notes 19 to 31 infra.
" 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1976), quoted in note 96 infra.
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ment final.' 0 Collateral review in a federal district court would not, how-
ever, be subject to a uniform time limit."' Aggrieved parties could con-
ceivably attack the state judgment years later.' 2 Without finality, the
value of a state court judgment is substantially impaired.
Third, under the reasoning in Robinson, state courts would no longer
be the final arbiters of state law, thus undermining a fundamental pre-
mise of federalism.' s The principle that state courts are free to modify
and overrule themselves must be as acceptable as the unquestioned abil-
ity of the United States Supreme Court to overrule and modify federal
law.'4 Yet, the impact of the Robinson decision contravenes this pillar of
federalism by empowering lower federal courts to rule invalid those deci-
sions which are deemed radical modifications of precedent. Questions of
state law therefore remain issues of state law only so long as they do not
change. Once a state court has effected profound change through deci-
sional law, it has created federal question jurisdiction. The integrity of
the state ruling and the traditionally inherent power of the court to shape
state law are at the mercy of the local federal district courts.
In light of these considerations, Robinson v. Ariyoshi must be viewed as
more than a case concerning water rights, ilis kuponos, ahupua'as,5 and
10 Id. § 2101 sets time limits for appeal or application for a writ of certiorari from various
types of decisions. Subsection (c) requires that an application for a writ of certiorari in a
civil suit like McBryde be taken within ninety days, although a Supreme Court Justice may
extend the period for sixty days for good cause.
11 Robinson involved a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). Because section 1983 does
not contain a statute of limitations, federal courts apply the state statute that would be
applicable in the most closely analogous state action. Shouse v. Pierce County, 559 F.2d
1142, 1146 (9th Cir. 1977); Carmicle v. Weddle, 555 F.2d 554, 555 (6th Cir. 1977); Meyer v.
Frank, 550 F.2d 726, 728 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 830 (1977). Hence, the limitations
statute applied is often different even though the nature of the section 1983 action is the
same. Compare Wooten v. Sanders, 572 F.2d 500 (5th Cir. 1978) (two-year Georgia statute
of limitations for analogous tort action), with Proctor v. Flex, 567 F.2d 635 (5th Cir. 1978)
(one-year Louisiana statute of limitations for analogous tort action).
", Sotomura v. County of Hawaii, 402 F. Supp. 95, 103-05 (D. Hawaii 1975) (six-year stat-
ute of limitations appropriate to Robinson-type claim by analogy to state statute of limita-
tions governing compensation on account of deprivation of land after registration).
3 Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125-26 (1945).
1" "State courts, like this Court, may ordinarily overrule their own decisions without of-
fending constitutional guaranties, even though parties may have acted to their prejudice on
the faith of the earlier decisions." Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Say. Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673,
681 n.8 (1930).
" The terms ills kuponos and ahupua'a were explained in Territory v. Bishop Trust Co.,
41 Hawaii 358, 361-62 (1956):
The unit of land was the ahupuaa [sic], usually running from the mountains to the
sea. Within the ahupuaa were a number of subdivisions, each of which was called an iii
[or iil of the ahupua'a]. This division was for the convenience of the chief, administered
by a konohiki or agent appointed by the chief. (It is only in the later statutes that the
chiefs or landlords are referred to as konohikis.) It had no existence separate from that
of the ahupuaa, except the so-called iii ku [iii kuponoj or independent iii, although the
independent ili paid tribute to the king.
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Hawaiian history. The decision changes the fulcrum in the delicate equi-
librium between state and federal courts and, if upheld on appeal, will
subordinate all state judicial systems within the Ninth Circuit to the fed-
eral district courts that reside in their respective states.
Perhaps an appropriate metaphor of the conflict between the federal
courts over Hawaii water rights is that of a traffic accident. The "colli-
sion" in this case was between the decision of the Supreme Court of Ha-
waii in McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson' and the injunction issued by the
federal district court in Robinson, voiding the McBryde decision. The
analogy is helpful not only to emphasize the force of the collision between
the state and federal courts,"' but also to show that issues are framed
depending upon the forum from which one views the case.
One phenomenon common to both vehicular and judicial collisions is
that persons with different perspectives will give divergent explanations
of what has happened. Yet, these conflicting descriptions each interpret
the same event. Similarly, as one views the questions posed in Robinson,
one eventually concludes that some characterizations of the issues are
merely different legal labels to describe the same event.
Second, in viewing this judicial collision there is a temptation to judge
fault in an either-or sense. One is prone to say, "If driver A were right,
then driver B must be wrong." In our case the danger is in constructing a
theorem that if the McBryde decision were "wrong," then Robinson is
"right," and if Robinson were "wrong," then McBryde is "right." This
absolutist approach has focused commentary solely on the substantive
water law issues;1B that is, the divergent interpretations of water rights as
manifested in McBryde and Robinson. Commentators reason that if the
McBryde court constructed a new doctrine on a false foundation of mis-
read Hawaiian water rights cases, then the Robinson court's interpreta-
tion of water law must be correct. Ergo, federal intervention was proper
because it achieved the "right" result.
However, the first and most critical question to be asked about this
"collision" is whether the second vehicle, namely, the Robinson decision,
had a right to be in the intersection in the first place. If it did not, then
the analytical care with which the district court approached the first vehi-
cle, the merits of the McBryde decision, loses its impact. In other words,
the central issue is whether the federal court had proper jurisdiction. If
there was no power to intervene and nullify, then the Hawaii Supreme
Court's decision in McBryde must be final regardless of its consistency
16 54 Hawaii 174, 504 P.2d 1330 (1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976, cert. denied and ap-
peal dismissed sub nom. McBryde Sugar Co. v. Hawaii, 417 U.S. 962 (1974).
17 Moreover, as in most accidents, the accusations of fault were quite vigorous. See 441 F.
Supp. at 566.
is See Van Dyke, Chang, Aipa, Higham, Marsden, Sur, Tagamori & Yukumoto, Water
Rights in Hawaii, in LAND AND WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN HAWAII 141 (Hawaii Insti-
tute for Management and Analysis in Government 1977).
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with prior water rights law.
This article therefore does not attempt to discuss the different inter-
pretations of Hawaiian water rights as expressed in McBryde and Robin-
son. Rather, it addresses the threshold issue of the jurisdictional power of
federal courts and attempts an investigation of the circumstances under
which district courts may rightfully "collide" with state tribunals. Before
proceeding, a brief description of the two "vehicles" is in order.
McBryde is the Hawaii Supreme Court decision culminating some
twenty years of litigation regarding the extent to which various parties
have rights to the water in the Hanapepe River. The parties involved
were the State of Hawaii 9 and the various landowners whose property
adjoined the river and streams.2 0 The supreme court affirmed the trial
court's determination of appurtenant water rights, defined as the right to
take the amount of water historically needed to grow taro.2s But the court
set down two rulings that surprised the parties.
First, the court held that all the surplus water in the State, including
normal and storm and freshet surpluses, is the property of the State.22 In
large part, the suit originally had been instituted to determine the rights
of the various parties to the surplus waters in the stream. Absent the
explicit urging of any of the parties, the supreme court held that the
State owned all the surplus waters.
The second ruling was that water rights acquired by virtue of owner-
ship of lands adjoining a stream could not be transferred to other par-
cels.2 3 The basis of this ruling was, in part, that section 577 of the Revised
Laws of Hawaii (1925)24 codified the doctrine of riparianism as it existed
in Massachusetts in 1850. This ruling was particularly devastating to the
sugar plantations since the large agricultural users have continuously
transported water to other watersheds. Such irrigation systems had been
the foundation for the growth of the sugar industry.2 5
19 The State was involved in litigation because it was the owner of the ahupua'a of
Hanapepe.
20 See note 5 supra.
21 54 Hawaii at 189, 504 P.2d at 1319-40.
2 Id. at 200, 504 P.2d at 1345.
2 Id. at 191, 198, 504 P.2d at 1341, 1344.
24 The statute remains substantially unchanged and is currently codified at HAWAI REV.
STAT. § 7-1 (1976) which provides as follows:
Building materials, water, etc.; landlords' titles subject to tenants' use.
Where the landlords have obtained, or may hereafter obtain, allodial titles to their lands,
the people on each of their lands shall not be deprived of the right to take firewood,
house-timber, aho cord, thatch, or ki leaf, from the land on which they live, for their own
private use, but they shall not have a right to take such articles to sell for profit. The
people shall also have a right to drinking water, and running water, and the right of way.
The springs of water, running water, and roads shall be free to all, on all lands granted in
fee simple; provided, that this shall not be applicable to wells and water-courses, which
individuals have made for their own use.
25 See Brief for Amicus Curiae, Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Ass'n at 8-12, Robinson v.
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All parties except the State sought a rehearing before the Hawaii Su-
preme Court. s The court granted a rehearing but denied petitioners' re-
quest to argue the constitutionality of the earlier decision.2 7 The supreme
court affirmed its prior decision"s with two justices dissenting. 9 Petition-
ers then sought review in the United States Supreme Court on the bases
of appeal and certiorari. The Court denied review.30
Prior to the Court's denial, petitioners instituted attack on the Mc-
Bryde decision in the United States District Court for the District of Ha-
waii,31 seeking a declaratory judgment that the McBryde decision was un-
constitutional. The district court assumed jurisdiction 2 and on October
26, 1977, issued its opinion, Robinson v. Ariyoshi. The court held that the
Hawaii Supreme Court decision in McBryde was an unconstitutional
"taking" of private property and therefore void.3 3 State officials were en-
joined from attempting to enforce the McBryde ruling, 4 and the case was
partially remanded to the state trial court.8 5
Several institutional interests are directly affected by the water law is-
sues in Robinson. The sugar industry, while applauding the federal deci-
sion, is not yet out of the canefield. Still to follow is the decision of the
Ninth Circuit and potential review in the United States Supreme Court.
Until there is a final resolution, the business of buying and selling water
rights 8 will be paralyzed by the uncertainty of the appellate process.
Ariyoshi, No. 78-2264 (9th Cir., filed Nov. 28, 1978). The sugar growers assert that most
modern plantations are "absolutely dependent" on the presently extensive irrigation sys-
tems. Id. at 14-15.
" The parties seeking a rehearing were Olokele Sugar Company, McBryde Sugar Com-
pany, Gay & Robinson, and the nonappellant small owners.
" The Hawaii Supreme Court limited reargument to the following points: (1) The rele-
vance of section 7-1 of the Hawaii Revised Statutes (1968) to the water rights of the parties
and (2) the legal theories which support a conclusion that appurtenant water rights can be
used on other parcels. McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson, 55 Hawaii 260, 261, 517 P.2d 26, 27
(1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974). See note 24 supra and accompanying text for an
explanation of the statute involved.
8 McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson, 55 Hawaii 260, 517 P.2d 26 (1973), cert. denied, 417
U.S. 976 (1974).
11 Id. at 261, 262, 517 P.2d at 27 (Marumoto, J., and Levinson, J., dissenting).
30 417 U.S. 962 (1974).
3' The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction and denied certiorari
on June 17, 1974. Id. Petitioners filed their complaint in the federal district court more than
four months prior to the Supreme Court dismissal. Civ. No. 74-32 (D. Hawaii, filed Feb. 2,
1974). The fact that the Court dismissed the McBryde appeal is another intriguing aspect of
the Robinson litigation inasmuch as dimissa for want of a substantial federal question is
considered an adjudication on the merits. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344 (1975).
32 The district court asserted jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343, 2201, 2283 (1976)
and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). 441 F. Supp. at 562.
S3 441 F. Supp. at 585-86.
" Id. at 586.
3 Id.
36 See id. at 577:
Since the earliest recognition of private property in Hawaii, rights to surface waters
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Moreover, various county and state agencies such as the board of water
supply, the department of health, and the department of land and natu-
ral resources await clarification of the water rights situation in order to
implement plans to regulate and preserve Hawaii's diminishing water
supply. 7 Furthermore, environmentalists and downstream owners, in-
trigued by the implications of the riparian doctrine adopted by the Ha-
waii Supreme Court, are waiting for possible vindication of that decision
in order to use it as the legal basis for preserving the natural state of
stream waters.88
It is against this background of concern over the status of water rights
and the incipient judicial conflict over ultimate power to resolve the con-
troversy that this article attempts to unravel the complexities in Robin-
son v. Ariyoshi. While there probably will be no final resolution until the
United States Supreme Court once again acts on this case, it is definitely
of value to the various interests involved to dissect Robinson and to pre-
dict how it may be decided.
I. JUSTICE STEWART AND THE LAYMEN'S VIEW OF A "TAKING"
The crucial question in Robinson is not whether the Hawaii Supreme
Court was correct in its interpretation of Hawaiian water rights, but
whether the federal court had the power to judge the propriety of the
state court's interpretation of these rights. In other words, did the federal
district court properly assert jurisdiction?
Jurisdiction in Robinson was based inter aliass on both 28 U.S.C. §
1331 (1976), federal question jurisdiction, and 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1976),
which confers jurisdiction to redress rights arising under the Constitution
or federal statutes in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. §
have been bought, sold, leased and otherwise dealt with as other private property. The
government has bought and paid for privately owned surface water and all branches of
the Hawaiian government have consistently dealt with surface water however owned or
acquired by the government in all respects and in the same manner as private persons.
17 As of November 1979, the Hawaii State Board .of Land and Natural Resources has
adopted Regulation 9, Control of Groundwater Use, for regulation of groundwater under
chapter 177 of the Hawaii Revised Statutes (1976); the board has proposed designation of
the Pearl Harbor Basin for regulation under the statute. The State Department of Land and
Natural Resources, as part of its functional plan for water resources development mandated
by chapter 226 of the Hawaii Revised Statutes (Supp. 1979), has proposed regulating the
development and use of all ground and surface waters by a permit system. See HAWAII DEP'T
OF LAND AND NATURAL RESOURCES, STATE WATER RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT PLAN 133-65
(Draft, July 1979).
" In Reppun v. Board of Water Supply, Civ. No. 50121 (1st Cir. Ct. Hawaii, Oct. 15,
1979) plaintiffs asserted that the upstream diversion of water by the defendant Honolulu
Board of Water Supply illegally deprived them of water. In particular, plaintiffs asserted
that under the McBryde decision, as owners of riparian land bordering a stream, they have
the statutory right to "running water." Trial Brief for Plaintiff at 9.
" See note 32 supra.
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1983 (1976). In essence, both sections require the existence of a federal
question. Although the records were in both cases different, Robinson was
based on essentially the same "factual" situation as McBryde,40 a situa-
tion primarily involving nonfederal, state property law issues concerning
water rights. The question therefore arises as to what constituted the new
issue upon which federal question jurisdiction was asserted. The Robin-
son court purports to answer this question through its analysis of two
constitutional provisions.
First, the court said that the Hawaii Supreme Court's decision in Mc-
Bryde and the state court's conduct in reaching that decision were a dep-
rivation of procedural due process, a right derived from the fourteenth
amendment.4 Petitioners had alleged a multitude of due process viola-
tions in the form of procedural irregularities.'2 The Robinson court found
that the failure of the state court to grant petitioners an opportunity on
rehearing to argue the constitutional questions was itself sufficient basis
for reversal.' This will be referred to as the procedural due process claim.
The taking argument was the second federal question that the court
grasped. The fifth amendment," as applied to state action by the four-
teenth amendment, prohibits a taking by the state without just compen-
sation.45 In the view of the federal court, a taking occurred when the Ha-
waii court, through its decision in McBryde, diminished the water rights
of petitioners.' This will be termed the substantive due process claim.
The approach taken by the court in Robinson was not a very tradi-
40 Both Robinson and McBryde were actions ultimately seeking a clarification of the own-
ership of water rights of the various parties. The evidentiary records presented before the
Hawaii Supreme Court and the federal district court were, of course, different. The conduct
of the Hawaii Supreme Court in its issuance and the content of its McBryde decision were
the focus of the federal court action. Nevertheless, the facts regarding the conduct of the
litigants in their use and reliance on water rights over time were the same before both
tribunals.
41 441 F. Supp. at 580.
"' Petitioners alleged that the McBryde decision deprived them of due process by: (1)
Overruling earlier decisions that the normal surplus of water of a stream belongs to the
konohiki (owner of the land on which it arises) and he is free to transfer it out of the
watershed; and (2) deciding issues that were neither raised nor tried in lower court, thus
depriving the parties of an opportunity to present evidence. Id. at 580-83.
4' Id. at 580.
U.S. CONST. amend. V provides, in pertinent part: "No person shall be ... deprived of
life, liberty or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for
public use without just compensation."
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
46 As the district court noted in Robinson:
It may be that the court did not conceive of its action as a taking-it said the plaintiffs
never had had any such water rights, ergo, no taking! Just that simple!
• . . For over a century neither the State nor its predecessors in title ever attempted to
take water rights without either purchase or condemnation, but McBryde I took the
plaintiffs' water rights for the State . ...
441 F. Supp. at 585 (emphasis added at "took the plaintiffs' water rights for the State").
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tional application of the fifth amendment. One normally associates a tak-
ing with the executive branch of government through use of the power of
eminent domain. It is obviously a taking when the State confiscates pri-
vate property to build a highway. But, has a taking occurred when a state
supreme court decides that a piece of property belongs to neither claim-
ants X nor Y and declares that the property belongs to a third party, Z?
The Robinson court found no logical distinction between confiscation of
property to build a highway and the elimination of the party's water
rights in McBryde.41 The court's logic was simple. The petitioners had
water rights prior to the McBryde decision; they did not have these rights
after the McBryde decision. Ergo, the decision took these rights away.
Moreover, it was the "State" which took these rights by acting through a
state entity, the judiciary.
One might label this the "laymen's view of a taking." The term "lay" as
used by Professor Bruce A. Ackerman48 is not unflattering, but rather de-
scribes an eminently sensible conclusion based primarily on simplicity
and clarity. The laymen's view requires no deep legal scholarship to reach
its conclusion. The concept is based on the fundamental legal principle of
securing private property from governmental interference." The laymen's
perspective reflects such a prominent societal value that one assumes it
must be expressed somewhere in the Constitution. It is so because it must
be so. It could not be otherwise in a legal system based on private prop-
erty. As Professor Laurence H. Tribe has put it:
Most people know a taking when they see one, or at least they think they do.
Before the taking, an object or a piece of land belonged to X, who could use it
in a large number of ways and who enjoyed legal protection in preventing
others from doing things to it without X's permission. After the taking, X's
relationship to the object or the land was fundamentally transformed; he could
no longer use it at all, and other people could invoke legal arguments and
mechanisms to keep him away from it exactly as he had been able to invoke
such arguments and mechanisms before the taking had occurred. As Professor
Bruce Ackerman has shown in a thoughtful analysis of the taking problem,
much of the constitutional law of takings is built upon this ordinary, lay view
of what a "taking" is all about.50
The court in Robinson appears to share this lay view of a taking, that it
must be a taking because government cannot be allowed to condemn
without compensation merely by clothing its actions in the sanctity of the
judiciary.' The court quoted Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in
" Id. at 583-86.
48 See B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 88-167 (1977).
4' L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 456 (1978).
10 Id. at 459-60 (footnote omitted).
11 441 F. Supp. at 585 (quoting Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 296-97 (1967) (Stew-
art, J., concurring)). See text accompanying note 61.
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Hughes v. Washington" in applying the protections of fourteenth amend-
ment due process to the judiciary.5 3 Both opinions reason by implication:
The fifth amendment applies to the States by incorporation through the
fourteenth amendment;5 ' since the fourteenth amendment applies to the
actions of courts in other contexts,"5 the fifth amendment also must apply
to the courts by virtue of the fourteenth amendment.
Although Hughes was decided on different grounds," the concurring
opinion of Justice Stewart discussed an alternative issue very similar to
the question before the court in Robinson.5 7 The Supreme Court of
Washington had decided in 1946 that title to gradual shoreline accretions
vested in the owner of the adjoining land." Twenty years later, the Wash-
ington court reversed itself and held that the same constitutional provi-
sion, properly construed, terminated the rights of such landowners. 5' For
the lay observer this judicial about-face was clearly a taking. Property
that had existed under the first decision was taken away by the second.
Justice Stewart posed the problem in this manner: "Does a prospective
change in state property law constitute a compensable taking . . . "60
His affirmative answer demonstrates the force of the argument that it is
so because it must be so:
[A] State cannot be permitted to defeat the constitutional prohibition against
taking property without due process of law by the simple device of asserting
retroactively that the property it has taken never existed at all. Whether the
decision here worked an unpredictable change in state law thus inevitably
presents a federal question for the determination of this Court .... 61
Justice Stewart also concluded that the fifth amendment applies to
state courts. "Because the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment forbids such confiscation by a State, no less through its courts than
52 389 U.S. 290, 294 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring).
" 441 F. Supp. at 585 (quoting 389 U.S. at 298 (1967)).
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
" See, e.g., North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975) (due process
clause); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (equal protection clause).
The majority opinion in Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290 (1967), decided that fed-
eral, not state, law was controlling on the question of ownership of future accretions to lands
conveyed by the United States to a private owner prior to statehood. The state court had
held that state law controlled. The State's constitution, the state court concluded, denied
the landowner any future rights to accretion. Thus, the majority did not consider the ques-
tion of whether an overruling judgment of a state court could "take" property vested by an
earlier decision. Justice Stewart, on the other hand, argued that if the state constitution had
unambiguously denied the landowner the right to future accretion, then the question of
change in state law would raise the taking issue.
7 See 389 U.S. at 294-98 (Stewart, J., concurring); note 56 supra.
's Ghione v. State, 26 Wash. 2d 635, 175 P.2d 955 (1946).
Hughes v. State, 67 Wash. 2d 799, 410 P.2d 20 (1966), rev'd, 389 U.S. 290 (1967).
389 U.S. at 295-96 (Stewart, J., concurring).
61 Id. at 296-97 (citations omitted).
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through its legislature, and no less when a taking is unintended than
when it is deliberate, I join in reversing the judgment."'6
Fundamental to the lay view of Justice Stewart and the court in Robin-
son is the fear that a State can avoid the obligation to compensate so long
as its highest court-simply rules that the object seized is not property or
that it has always belonged to another. Property could disappear in the
sense that a judicial panel "finds" the "true" rule that the claimant's
property never existed in the first place. Such evanescent rights would
not be compensated under the fifth amendment.
Thus, the primary basis for the court's decision in Robinson was the lay
view that when one's property vanishes at the hands of a governmental
agency, even if that entity be the state judiciary, a taking has occurred
and compensation must be paid. The following section will discuss a sec-
ondary proposition implicit in the Robinson opinion that there are consti-
tutional due process limitations on the ability of courts to overrule prior
doctrines upon which persons have relied.6 3
II. RETROACTIVE OVERRULING AND DuE PROCESS
The Hawaii Supreme Court's decision in McBryde is complicated by
all of the constitutional problems associated with retroactive overruling.
Retroactive overruling is endemic to the judicial process and is obviously
required in any legal system that seeks to avoid being forever locked into
ancient doctrines. Moreover, for many years retroactive decisions were
thought to be the only possible, logical kind.6 Retroactive overruling was
a necessary element of traditional Blackstonian thinking. When judges
overruled an earlier decision, they were not deemed to have "pro-
nounce[d] a-new law, but to [have] maintain[ed] and expound[ed] the old
one."
6 5
e' Id. at 298. The Robinson court quoted most of this rationale. 441 F. Supp. at 585.
441 F. Supp. at 585 (citing Muhlker v. New York & Harlem R.R., 197 U.S. 544 (1905)).
The controversy surrounding the constitutionality of prospective overruling was re-
solved in Great Northern Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., 287 U.S. 358, 364 (1932), where the
Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Cardozo, stated that courts were free to choose
between retroactive and prospective overruling.
6 Levy, Realist Jurisprudence and Prospective Overruling, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 2 (1960)
[hereinafter cited as Levy] (quoting 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 69).
The judge merely finds the preexisting law; he then merely declares what he finds. A
prior judicial decision is not the law itself but only evidence of what the law is. Thus a
later judicial decision which seems to change the law has not really changed it at all but
has only discovered the "true" rule which was always the law. It follows that any judicial
"change" in the law must necessarily be retroactive. It could not be otherwise, for the
judge is deemed merely to be articulating what the law has always been-as though the
law were, in Holmes' irony-tipped phrase, a "brooding omnipresence" and not some deci-
sion to be made by some specific court. The parties acted yesterday but the law at which
the court arrives today is the law which nonetheless covered yesterday's conduct.
Id. at 2 (footnote omitted) (original emphasis).
1979]
UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII LAW REVIEW
This view of retroactive overruling consistently has drawn criticism
when it resulted in the overturning of prior doctrines in property law. 6
Hardships obviously occur when a party who has relied on previously
sanctioned property rights has those rights extinguished under a new de-
cision. In Blackstonian terms, however, it would be argued that this party
never had a property right in the first place. Thus, to return to the fifth
amendment, there was no taking.
Due to the harshness of this view, an exception to the general rule of
retroactivity has been urged in cases dealing with property rights. 7 It was
asserted that the exception was necessary to assure stability in property
law." Realists urged the application of prospective overruling to avoid
the dilemma.6 9
Prospective overruling, however, is simply not possible in a case like
McBryde where the court is ruling upon the question of ownership. Ques-
tions of ownership and determinations of title are retroactive concepts
inextricably rooted in a Blackstonian view. The judge, in his search to
determine title, is "deemed merely to be articulating what the law has
always been."70
Retroactive overruling is, therefore, the only type of overruling which is
consistent with the determinations of title and ownership. When such
overruling does occur, for example, when the court decides that X and
not Y has always been the owner of the property, it is easy to see why a
claim can be made that Y's property has been taken. If the beneficiary of
the decision is the State, as in Robinson, it is also easy to see how the
overruling can be viewed as a violation of the fifth amendment if no com-
pensation is paid. Answers to these dilemmas lie in an examination of the
constitutional limits on retroactive overruling.
The first important case that requires analysis is Muhlker v. New York
& Harlem Railroad.71 Muhlker is often resurrected in discussions con-
cerning the constitutionality of retroactive overruling.7 1 The court in
Robinson relied on it,7 and the sugar companies frequently cited it in
their post-McBryde arguments.74
" See, e.g., Kamau v. County of Hawaii, 41 Hawaii 527, 551 (1957) (stare decisis can be
applied more flexibly in cases which do not involve "property" rights); Note, Prospective
Operation of Decisions Holding Statutes Unconstitutional or Overruling Prior Decisions,
60 H.Av. L. REv. 437, 442 (1974) (arguing that property rights should be handled on a pro-
spective overruling basis).
07 See Note, supra note 66, at 442.
" See generally id.
19 Id. at 442-43, 447-48.
70 Levy, supra note 65, at 2.
71 197 U.S. 544 (1905).
72 E.g., Stimson, Retroactive Application of Law-A Problem in Constitutional Law, 38
MICH. L. REv. 30 (1939) [hereinafter cited as Stimson].
7" 441 F. Supp. at 585.
7, See Answering Brief for Selwyn A. Robinson at 45, Answering Brief for Olokele Sugar
Co. at 46, Answering Brief for McBryde Sugar Co. at 32-33, Robinson v. Ariyoshi, Civ. No.
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The facts in Muhlker are similar to those in McBryde. In 1888, when
Muhlker purchased his land in New York City, New York law held that
the erection of an elevated railroad was not a public purpose or street use
within the meaning of an 1813 statute. The statute had been interpreted
by cases to mean that the owner of real estate could bring a damage suit
against the builder of an elevated railroad constructed in front of his
property. The New York & Harlem Railroad built an elevated railroad in
front of Muhlker's property. The New York Court of Appeals reversed its
prior decisions and held that an elevated railroad was a public use within
the meaning of the statute. Thus, Muhlker could not sue. The United
States Supreme Court, however, reversed and held that the retroactive
overruling by the New York Court of Appeals deprived Muhlker of his
property without due process of law. Writing for the Court, Justice McK-
enna said:
When the plaintiff acquired his title those cases were the law of New York, and
assured to him that his easements of light and air were secured by contract as
expressed in those cases, and could not be taken from him without payment of
compensation.
And this is the ground of our decision. We are not called upon to discuss the
power, or the limitations upon the power, of the courts of New York to declare
rules of property or change or modify their decisions, but only to decide that
such power cannot be exercised to take away rights which have been acquired
by contract and have come under the protection of the Constitution of the
United States. 5
Although not a careful analysis of the contract clause or the fourteenth
amendment, Justice McKenna's reasoning, as an expression of the lay
view, seemed eminently sensible. How could Muhlker's easements to light
and air which had existed under prior law be summarily obliterated by a
simple declaration of the New York Court of Appeals? If the New York
Legislature or the executive branch had attempted to do this, the con-
tract clause or the fifth amendment easily could have been invoked by
Muhlker to protect his rights. Thus, the question was whether the courts
could accomplish by declaration what the legislature was prohibited from
doing. Under the lay view, they certainly could not. Under this view the
Muhiker decision, regardless of whether it was based on the contract
clause or the due process clause, must be right. It must be so.
The continued validity of Muhiker squarely conflicts with the argu-
ment made here that courts cannot "take" property through their deci-
sional processes. Although Muhiker never has been explicitly overruled, it
has been undermined by the judicially expressed views stated in later
cases;7 16 namely, that there are no property rights in the decisions of
78-2264 (9th Cir., filed Nov. 28, 1978).
78 197 U.S. at 570.
"' See, e.g., cases cited in note 79 infra.
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courts and that changes in law are not a deprivation of due process.
Ten years prior to Muhlker, the United States Supreme Court had
taken a different position in Central Land Co. v. Laidley." The facts in
Laidley parallel those of Muhlker and McBryde. A West Virginia court
reconstrued a statute to hold that a deed, which had been valid under an
earlier statutory interpretation, was invalid and that a later deed con-
veyed title. Answering the claim that the new construction was an uncon-
stitutional deprivation of property without due process, the Court stated:
"When the parties have been fully heard in the regular course of judicial
proceedings, an erroneous decision of a state court does not deprive the
unsuccessful party of his property without due process of law, within the
14th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. '78 Thus, Laid-
ley and Muhlker were at odds with each other. However, in subsequent
cases the Court followed Laidley.7 In fact, Muhlker was treated as based
on the contract clause.80 Moreover, the significance of Muhlker was re-
duced when the Court stated that the contract clause applied only to ac-
tions by the legislature.81
In his 1939 article, Dean Edward S. Stimson pointed out that another
weakness of Muhlker was its reliance upon Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque."
In Gelpcke, a state statute authorized the issuance of municipal bonds in
exchange for stock of railroad companies in order to encourage develop-
ment. In several decisions the Iowa Supreme Court had upheld the con-
stitutionality of the law. After the City of Dubuque issued bonds pursu-
ant to the statute, the Iowa court reversed its previous decisions and
invalidated the statute. The holders of the bonds sued in federal court
under diversity jurisdiction to recover the money due on the interest cou-
pons. The federal district court applied the latest Iowa decision and de-
nied recovery. The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that
the last Iowa decision should be ignored and that the earlier decisions
upholding validity should be followed.
The facts in Gelpcke and Muhlker are similar, but the procedural dif-
ference is significant. Muhlker was based on a direct appeal from the
state supreme court decision, while petitioners in Gelpcke had filed suit
in federal court under diversity jurisdiction subsequent to the state court
decision. Gelpcke, however, belonged to the era of Swift v. Tyson83 when
77 159 U.S. 103 (1895).
71 Id. at 112.
"8 Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan, 263 U.S. 444 (1924); Dunbar v. City of New York, 251 U.S.
516 (1920); Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907).
80 Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan, 263 U.S. 444, 452-53 (1924). See Stimson, supra note 72, at
51 (making the argument).
" Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan, 263 U.S. 444, 451 (1924).
, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 175 (1864). For a discussion of this case see Stimson, supra note 72, at
48-49.
63 41 U.S. 1 (1842).
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the rule of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins84 was not applicable and federal
courts could refuse to apply the later decisions of a state court which
overruled earlier precedents upon which parties had relied. Hence,
Gelpcke and therefore the underlying rationale of Muhlker are tainted by
the prevailing view of the proper law to be applied in diversity actions at
the time they were decided. Gelpcke and its progeny were completely dis-
credited by the Court's 1938 decision in Erie which commanded the fed-
eral courts to apply substantive state law as determined by the state su-
preme court. Thus, one way of viewing Muhlker is that it was tenuously
based on Gelpcke;s since Gelpcke perished after Erie, so did this tenuous
justification for Muhlker.
A. Brinkerhoff-Faris and the Substantive-Procedural
Due Process Distinction
In 1930 the Supreme Court decided Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Savings
Co. v. Hill"5 and clarified the confused situation arising after Muhlker. In
Brinkerhoff-Faris, the bank claimed that the formula for assessing bank
property taxes at one hundred percent of value was discriminatory be-
cause other property was assessed only at seventy-five percent of value.
Six years before the action was filed, the Missouri Supreme Court had
decided that the relevant statute did not give the state tax commission
authority to make an adjustment and held that a suit in equity was the
proper means to address unfair taxation.87 When Brinkerhoff-Faris
brought its tax refund suit in a court of equity, the Missouri court re-
versed its earlier decision, ruling that equity was an improper forum and
the only remedy was by a claim to the tax commission. Under the new
interpretation, the application to the tax commission could only be made
before the tax books had been delivered to the commission. Brinkerhoff-
- 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The Gelpcke doctrine allowed the federal district court to ignore a
new interpretation by a state supreme court which "took" a person's rights. Muhlker was
based, at least in part, on Supreme Court approval of this practice by federal district courts
which had diversity jurisdiction of cases which were really "appeals" from the state supreme
court. The Erie doctrine in 1938 eliminated the ability of the federal district court to ignore
the last supreme court decision on the subject. The federal district court was thereafter
compelled to apply the state supreme court decision, even though it ostensibly took prop-
erty. Thus, since Muhlker was based on Gelpcke and the ability of the federal district court
to choose between the earlier "nontaking" supreme court decision and the later "taking"
supreme court decision, the force and effect of Muhlker was swept away with the advent of
Erie.
" "In other words, we are asked to extend to the present case the principle of Gelpcke v.
Dubuque and Louisiana v. Pilsbury. . . .That seems to me a great, unwarranted and un-
desirable extension of a doctrine which it took this court a good while to explain." Muhlker
v. New York & Harlem R.R., 197 U.S. 544, 573 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted).
- 281 U.S. 673 (1930).
V State v. State Tax Comm'n, 295 Mo. 298, 243 S.W. 887 (1922).
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Faris had delivered its tax book before it filed suit. The state decision
overruling prior law therefore completely denied Brinkerhoff-Faris a
remedy.
Although the United States Supreme Court reversed the Missouri Su-
preme Court, the Court made an important distinction between the case
before it and the Muhlker and Laidley decisions. Justice Brandeis, writ-
ing for the Court, distinguished Brinkerhoff-Faris on the ground that it
was a denial of procedural due process, as opposed to a denial of substan-
tive due process or the kind of taking involved in Muhlker. "Our present
concern is solely with the question whether the plaintiff has been ac-
corded due process in the primary sense, whether it has had an opportu-
nity to present its case and be heard in its support.""
Under Justice Brandeis' distinction, courts in their arbitral capacity
could not commit takings in a substantive due process sense, but courts
could deny due process in a fourteenth amendment, procedural due pro-
cess sense. Unfortunately, the district court in Robinson construed Brin-
kerhoff-Faris as holding that the judiciary as well as the legislature can
commit takings under the fifth amendment.89 It is a mistake to assume
that Brinkerhoff-Faris' use of due process includes the fifth amendment's
taking provision."
One commentator has asserted that Justice Brandeis' procedural-sub-
stantive due process distinction is not justified.91 Upon deeper analysis,
this rather unassuming distinction presents a brilliant means of resolving
problems of federalism and separation of powers. It also constitutes a
framework for conceptual clarification of the confusion surrounding the
question of whether courts can take property.
B. No Substantive Due Process Claim in Robinson
The first key implication from a proper reading of Brinkerhoff-Faris is
that there is no substantive due process claim in Robinson. In other
words, courts in their arbitral capacity just do not "take." Thus, there is
no basis for federal question jurisdiction. As Justice Brandeis stated in
Brinkerhoff-Faris: "Undoubtedly, the state court had the power to con-
strue the statute dealing with the State Tax Commission; and to reexam-
ine and overrule the Laclede case. Neither of these matters raises a fed-
eral question; neither is subject to our review . . . . 2
281 U.S. at 681.
s' 441 F. Supp. at 580. The error probably arose from the confusion engendered by the
fact that fifth amendment substantive due process is made applicable to the states through
the 14th amendment due process clause.
" See generally Note, Specifying the Procedures Required by Due Process: Toward Lim-
its on the Use of Interest Balancing, 88 HAitv. L. REv. 1510 (1975).
,1 Stimson, supra note 72, at 54.
2 281 U.S. at 681 (footnote omitted). The Laclede case refers to State v. State Tax
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In terms of balancing the power between federal and state courts, deny-
ing the federal courts jurisdiction in an action based on the theory of a
taking by a state supreme court decision serves the important purpose of
preserving state court sovereignty. One can easily imagine the problems
that would arise if federal courts could assume jurisdiction anytime a so-
called taking by a state court allegedly occurred.
First, how would the federal court determine whether a taking has oc-
curred? Justice Stewart in Hughes v. Washington9 suggested a test of
"unexpectedness. ' 9 4 Since federal courts have jurisdiction to determine
jurisdiction, it would be left to the federal courts to fashion this law of
unexpectedness and to determine when collateral attacks on state court
decisions are permissible. If every "unexpected" state court decision were
subject not only to United States Supreme Court review, but also to at-
tack by a federal district court on the basis of surprise, uncertainty as to
the finality of state supreme court decisions would persist well after their
rendition. Even if the district court dismissed a complaint, the plaintiff
would have the opportunity to appeal that dismissal to a circuit court of
appeals and to get a second chance at review by the Supreme Court.
Second, the use of federal question jurisdiction based on an unexpected
state decision does great violence to the principle of federalism set forth
in Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.,9" that the federal district courts are not
to act as appellate courts of the states. The attempt to act in such an
appellate capacity would clearly undermine the principle expressed in 28
U.S.C. § 1257 (1976)" that the United States Supreme Court has exclu-
sive jurisdiction to review decisions of state courts. Furthermore, it would
run counter to the unmistakable intent of Congress to refrain from giving
Comm'n, 295 Mo. 298, 243 S.W. 887 (1922), discussed in text accompanying note 87 supra,
where the State brought an action on behalf of Laclede Land & Improvement Co.
" 389 U.S. 290 (1967).
Id. at 296 (Stewart, J., concurring).
o 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923).
28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1976):
State courts; appeal; certiorari
Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a deci-
sion could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court as follows:
(1) By appeal, where is drawn in question the validity of a treaty or statute of the
United States and the decision is against its validity.
(2) By appeal, where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of any state on the
ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States,
and the decision is in favor of its validity.
(3) By writ of certiorari, where the validity of a treaty or statute of the United States
is drawn in question or where the validity of a State statute is drawn in question on the
ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States,
or where any title, right, privilege or immunity is specially set up or claimed under the
Constitution, treaties or statutes of, or commission held or authority exercised under, the
United States.
For the purposes of this section, the term "highest court of a State" includes the Dis-
trict of Columbia Court of Appeals.
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the lower federal courts power to review state court decisions."
Third, granting federal courts such jurisdiction would empower them to
control the rate of change in state law and in effect to decide questions of
state law. If federal courts can void state supreme court decisions, as the
court did in Robinson, then they possess a powerful tool to mold state law
simply by determining what that law may not be.
Fourth, Robinson-type intervention would increase the case load of fed-
eral courts thereby aggravating the concern shown by Congress and the
Supreme Court to reduce the federal court workload.9 8 Litigation would
increase in two ways: First, since every state supreme court decision
which overrules prior decisions or departs from a previously expected re-
sult could, in effect, be appealed to federal district courts, the federal dis-
trict courts would assume the appellate workload of the state courts; sec-
ond, since the direct path of state court appeals to the Supreme Court
would no longer represent a final determination in view of federal district
court review, litigants would perceive the state court system as useless
and tend to seek federal jurisdiction in cases where the state courts have
concurrent jurisdiction.
Although there is no indication that Justice Brandeis developed the
procedural-substantive due process distinction with an eye for these
state-federal problems, the dichotomy serves the very important function
of preserving state sovereignty in our federalist system. The intervention
based on procedural due process which Justice Brandeis sanctioned in
Brinkerhoff-Faris avoids these institutional problems since it does not al-
low the court to judge the substance of the state court decision but only
requires an adjudication of the fairness of the proceedings. The logical
remedy in such a situation would be to remand the case to the state court
for it to hold a proper hearing. Thus, there would be no "voiding" of the
state supreme court decision as in Robinson. The state court would only
be ordered to provide an adequate opportunity to be heard.
C. When Courts Legislate
Underlying this distinction between procedural and substantive due
process is a rather simple view of the intentions of the Framers of the
Constitution that the fifth amendment was meant to apply only to the
executive and legislative branches and not to the judicial branch of gov-
ernment. Viewed in this light, the fifth amendment fits in with other con-
stitutional provisions that prohibit the executive and legislative branches
of government from diminishing vested property rights without compen-
" See Stolz, Federal Review of State Court Decisions of Federal Questions: The Need
for Additional Appellate Capacity, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 943, 945-48 & 947 n.22 (1976).
,' See authorities cited in id. at 943 n.1.
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sation. For example, the contract clause of the Constitution," which pro-
hibits states from passing laws that impair contracts, has been held appli-
cable only to the actions of legislatures and not courts.'" Similarly, the ex
post facto clause 01 of the Constitution prohibits Congress and the State
legislatures from passing statutes that retroactively alter criminal laws,
but it also has been held inapplicable to decisions by courts.102
Placed in a framework where the contract clause prohibits legislatures
from destroying existing contract rights and the ex post facto clause pre-
vents legislatures from retroactively applying criminal laws, the fifth
amendment protects existing property rights from legislative destruction.
All these provisions were intended by the Framers of the Constitution
and the Bill of Rights to be the substantive limits on the power of the
legislature and not the judiciary.108
Since Blackstonian jurisprudence was clearly the dominant legal philos-
ophy at the time the Constitution was framed, it is understandable that
the original Framers applied these provisions only against the actions of
the legislature and not the judiciary. The "government" which needed
limiting was the legislature, not the judiciary. It was the legislature that
"made" laws. To the Blackstonian mind, the judiciary did not make law
but rather "found" the true law. Thus, a judge was not a lawmaker and
did not act directly against the individual. In a Blackstonian sense, only
legislatures could deprive persons of property, and courts would not be
subject to the limitations of the fifth amendment.
Obviously, the concept that courts never make laws has changed.""
Courts have the power to rewrite statutes,105 reopen schools,'" control
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10: "No State shall. . . pass any... Law impairing the Obliga-
tion of Contracts ......
100 Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan, 263 U.S. 444 (1924).
'0' U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, para. 3.
102 Ross v. Oregon, 227 U.S. 150 (1913) (courts not prohibited from giving retroactive
effect to overruling decisions).
103 It should be noted that the fifth amendment "takings" provision is only a limitation
on the actions of the Federal Government and not state governments. From the time of the
Constitution until 1868 when the 14th amendment was passed, the courts used the contract
clause to prohibit state legislatures from depriving individuals of property rights. Property
was thus defined and protected on the basis of contract rights. In 1897, the Supreme Court
held that the fifth amendment applied to the states through the 14th amendment due pro-
cess clause, and thus there was no longer a need for reliance on the contract clause. See
generally Stimson, supra note 72, at 31 n.4.
Since the contract clause clearly has no applicability to the actions of courts, the protec-
tion of property from retroactive laws prior to 1868 extended to cover only legislative and
not judicial action. There is no indication that the nature of the fifth amendment changed
after 1868 such that the protection of property from retroactive laws was extended to judi-
cial action.
104 See Levy, supra note 65, at 2.
105 See, e.g., State v. Huelsman, 60 Hawaii 71, 588 P.2d 394 (1978) (extended-term
sentencing).
'" See Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 233 (1964).
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prison admissions,'07 redistribute tax revenues,"' design legislative reap-
portionment schemes, 09 and order bussing of public school children.
110
Not much is left of the old adage: the legislature makes the laws and the
courts interpret them. Some ask whether courts should be allowed to leg-
islate so freely."1 But the question does not concern the wisdom of such
action since all might agree that too much legislating would be bad prac-
tice. The real question is whether the limits of judicial legislation are to
be self-imposed by the state courts or enforced by some outside institu-
tion such as a federal district court. Existing appellate jurisprudence is
somewhat schizophrenic; " ' while adhering to Blackstonian principles in
applying property concepts, everyone recognizes that courts can reach re-
sults indistinguishable from legislative actions.
When a court goes too far in legislating, as the court is accused of hav-
ing done in McBryde, adherents of the lay view find it logical to restrict
the courts with the same constitutional limitations that apply to legisla-
tive actions. The court in Robinson similarly expressed this view:
It [the McBryde decision] was strictly a "public-policy" decision with no prior
underlying "legal" justification therefor. The majority wanted to see streams
running down to the sea on an all-year-around basis. Knowing that this was
squarely contrary to the accepted state of water rights law of Hawaii, the court
first declared that the rule of stare decisis did not apply to water rights law. In
this case stare decisis interfered with the court's policy! "
Thus, another of the underlying rationales of the Robinson opinion is
the belief that when courts act in a legislative, policymaking mode they,
too, should be subject to the same substantive limits placed on legisla-
tures. The problem with this approach is that it would essentially under-
mine the sovereignty and mediation function of state judicial systems.
First, judges always, in a crude sense, have "made" law. This is no
modern phenomenon. The fact that we are now willing to admit that
courts legislate is a rather recent development. Moreover, it is an intellec-
tually more honest view of the tasks courts have been required to per-
form. Creation and interpretation of law cannot be clearly separated. Al-
though courts do not create law by writing statutes, they certainly create
law by filling statutory gaps and giving content to constitutional lan-
107 See Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976), aff'd sub nom. Newman v.
State, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 915 (1978).
108 See Jones v. Wittenberg, 330 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Ohio 1971), aff'd sub nom. Jones v.
Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972) (requiring transfer of public funds to improve prison
conditions).
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 586 (1964).
11 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 30 (1971).
.. See, e.g., Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1057 (1975).
" Levy, supra note 65, at 3.
8 441 F. Supp. at 566-67.
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guage. In each case, the real lawmaker is the one with the final authority
to say what the law is.
There may be justification in a clerical tradition for unwillingness to recognize
the responsibility of the law interpreter in himself giving the law its direction.
In the theological tradition, the church doctors or the rabbinical judges re-
garded themselves as construing the word of God. The word of God must re-
main untouched, but nonetheless the interpreters had to find a way of giving to
it their own human application for their own times. God said in the Old Testa-
ment: an eye for an eye. And that fiat could not be altered. But the judicial
sages regarded such intentional maiming as inhumane. Thus an eye for an eye
remains an eye for an eye; but it means, said the sages, due reparation. We
lawyers, however, are not operating in a theological tradition-at least not pro-
fessedly so-and once appellate judges face honestly their ineluctable lawcreat-
ing function, this critical pivot of our legal system will no longer be "among the
most neglected questions of legal scholarship."" 4
The advancing realism of courts has provided the basis for innovative
techniques such as prospective overruling. The fact that we are now will-
ing to describe the legal process in an honest fashion should not be used
to place the courts under the same constraints as the legislature, con-
straints which would seriously impair the ability of the courts to serve
their intended functions.
Second, equating courts with legislatures would skew the judicial pro-
cess by requiring, in effect, prospective overruling in cases dealing with
contracts, property, and criminal law where dispute resolution is only
meaningful in a retroactive context. Propsective overruling would clearly
contradict retroactive concepts in the law such as ownership.
Third, although the intent of the court in Robinson may have been only
to intervene in cases of the most egregious policymaking, the problem lies
in agreeing upon the criteria to be employed to determine which decisions
are truly "policy" decisions. What criteria would a federal judge use? It
seems inevitable that the thrust of the inquiry would consider the motiva-
tions and subjective views of the state court judges. For example, the fed-
eral court would be put in the position of inquiring whether the court in
McBryde intended to act in a legislative sense. Such an inquiry would be
impossible if not inherently misleading.
Fourth, courts often legitimately act in a policymaking sense. In at-
tempting to construe statutes in a manner consistent with the intent of
the draftsmen, courts must discern the policy to be effectuated. When
dealing with common law issues where there is no statutory language to
guide them, the courts often make law by arranging it to serve broadly
stated public policies. It was in this type of situation that the court in
McBryde acted. The court perceived the law of water rights to be unset-
1"4 Levy, supra note 65, at 5-6 (footnotes omitted).
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tied. 1 "5 It seized the policies evidenced by a long-ignored statute to serve
as a guide.1"" Arguably, the court made law only in the sense that all
courts that operate in voids or areas of uncertainty make law. Interven-
tion by a federal court based upon a fear that a state court is acting in a
legislative mode would create the same four federal-state institutional
problems mentioned earlier in Part IIB.11 7
Thus, for a number of reasons based on practical considerations as well
as legal theory, there can be no substantive due process claim arising out
of a state supreme court decision which changes law. There is no prop-
erty, in a fifth amendment sense, in the decisions of a court. Hence, there
is no property to be taken by a court which chooses to overrule a prior
decision. Furthermore, in a jurisprudential sense, courts which determine
ownership, cannot "take" property. Moreover, the Framers of the Consti-
tution, as part of the scheme to limit the legislature, could not have in-
tended the fifth amendment to apply to the decisions and judgments of
courts. Lastly, while the Supreme Court in Muhiker implied that the fifth
amendment could, in certain situations, apply to courts, that decision has
not been followed and has been superseded by the procedural-substantive
due process distinction of Brinkerhoff-Faris.
III. PROCEDURAL DuE PROCESS
Brinkerhoff-Faris clearly implies that a procedural due process ques-
tion may exist upon which to base federal jurisdiction. Petitioners in
Robinson understandably raised a number of due process claims, specifi-
cally as follows: (1) That they were not granted the right to argue the
constitutionality of the taking on rehearing before the Hawaii Supreme
Court, (2) that the Hawaii Supreme Court improperly failed to give res
judicata or stare decisis effect to previous cases, (3) that the Hawaii Su-
preme Court resolved the case in a manner not urged by any of the par-
ties, and (4) that the Hawaii Supreme Court ruled on issues not properly
brought before it. Although detailed analysis of these claims is beyond
the scope of this article, a few brief comments are appropriate.
As to issue (1), that failure to allow argument on the constitutional tak-
ing issue'was a denial of due process, the first question is whether there
was a right to a rehearing in the first place.118 If not, it is difficult to
115 McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson, 54 Hawaii 174, 181-87, 504 P.2d 1330, 1335-39 (1973),
cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976, cert. denied and appeal dismissed sub nom. McBryde Sugar Co.
v. Hawaii, 417 U.S. 962 (1974).
110 Id. at 185-87, 191-93, 504 P.2d at 1338-39, 1341-42.
See text accompanying notes 94-98 supra.
It Arguably, there is no right to rehearing under the Hawaii Supreme Court Rules, which
provide:
Rehearing. (a) Time and Form. A petition for rehearing may be presented only within
10 days after the filing of the opinion or ruling unless by special leave additional time is
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construct a constitutional right to argue all issues once a rehearing was
granted. Since rehearing is discretionary," ' not a matter of right, the
court must also have discretionary power to limit the issues considered on
rehearing. Whether the court abused its discretion by denying argument
on the alleged constitutional issue, thereby violating due process, is inevi-
tably a question controlled by the substantive due process issue.
In any event, if it is true that courts cannot take property, refusing to
allow argument on that ground was harmless error. The court in McBryde
apparently decided that the constitutional claims were not substantial. If
it is true that courts cannot take, then the Hawaii Supreme Court was
essentially correct in its judgment that the issue was inappropriate on
rehearing.
As to point (2), that the supreme court failed to give res judicata or
stare decisis effect to previous cases, the question of the court's right to
overrule is, in effect, merely a restatement of the original taking issue.
Whether res judicata must be applied is a question of state law to be
determined by the highest court of the State.1 10 Thus, the Hawaii Su-
preme Court's implicit or explicit rejection of prior state law in applying
res judicata in McBryde is clearly within the court's power to fashion the
res judicata law of the State.
Suppose that this new application of law or failure to apply res judicata
is a radical departure from previous Hawaii law. Does that raise a consti-
tutional question? It cannot create a fifth amendment claim if one agrees
with the analysis that courts cannot take. Does it nevertheless constitute
a procedural due process violation? Arguably not, since the remedy would
not be procedural. In other words, if the federal court were to intervene
on the basis that the state supreme court's failure to apply res judicata
was a denial of procedural due process, it would be forcing the state court
to modify its substantive law of res judicata; 11 that is, to confine the
holding in McBryde. to prior decisional law. The remedy would dictate
granted during such period by a justice. The petition shall briefly and distinctly state its
grounds and shall include points and authorities relied on in support thereof and shall
also be supported by a certificate of counsel to the effect that it is presented in good
faith and not for delay.
(b) Argument; Reply; Allowance. No reply to a petition for rehearing wilr'be received
unless requested by the court or by a justice who concurred in the opinion or ruling and
no petition for rehearing will be granted in the absence of such a request. There shall be
no oral argument on a petition for rehearing.
R. HAWAII SUP. CT. 5.
119 Since there is no contrary statutory requirement, the supreme court is free to deny
petitions for rehearing, as it frequently does. See, e.g., American Ins. Co. v. Takahashi, 59
Hawaii 102, 577 P.2d 780 (1978) (rehearing denied).
" Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co., 309 U.S. 4 (1939) (res judicata
effect of state judgment is governed by state law). See Comment, Res Judicata in the Fed-
eral District Courts: Application of Federal or State Law: Possible Differences Between the
Two, 51 CORNELL L.Q. 96 (1965).
"' See text accompanying notes 141-53, infra.
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the substantive outcome in the case and therefore would not be procedu-
ral. Such a claim would not be based on the procedural due process, op-
portunity-to-be-heard type of violation found in Brinkerhoff-Faris, but
rather upon a substantive due process violation derived from the notion
that courts can take, a notion discussed and rejected in the preceding
section.
Issues (3) and (4) raise the problem of surprise occurring in the appel-
late process. Petitioners complained that the result reached was unex-
pected and that the decision was based on issues not raised. If the court's
decision is not based on the legal issues presented, then the court's lan-
guage must be dicta1 22 and therefore not binding on the parties before the
court. Thus, to the degree that the statements in McBryde are not based
on any facts implicitly or explicitly brought before the court, they are
harmless to the parties and, moreover, not particularly unusual in the ap-
pellate process. For example, if the factual issue of transporting water
outside of the watershed were not part of a question of law essential to
the judgment in McBryde, then the court's statements prohibiting trans-
fer must be dicta. In essence, the court would be indicating how it would
rule in the future if a party brought a transfer-of-water case before it.
Similarly, any part of the McBryde decision that was decided in a man-
ner not urged by the parties and for which there was no factual basis
must be dicta. If, however, there was some factual basis, the situation is
not very different from many cases where courts arrive at a decision
based on judicially noticed facts.128 For example, if X and Y bring a de-
claratory judgment action to determine which of the two of them owns
Iolani Palace,124 is the state court prevented by any substantive doctrines
from declaring that the State of Hawaii is the owner? Would such a deci-
sion be void? Is not the question of whether anyone other than X or Y
owns Iolani Palace implicitly raised by their action, or is the court re-
quired to choose between X and Y9
In any event, a defect based on procedural due process is more easily
See R. CASAD, RES JUDICATA 8 (1976):
Declarations of law or of the meaning of laws made by the court have no binding force
as precedent for later cases unless the declaration was made in resolving a question of
law that was necessary to the decision of the case before the court. Only such declara-
tions are "holdings" having stare decisis effect. Other statements of law contained in the
court's opinion are dicta which may or [may] not be followed in later cases ....
'" For a general discussion of judicial notice, see 10 MoosE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 200.01,
at II-1 (2d ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as MooRE's]. It is well established that an appellate
court can take judicial notice of facts even though the trial court did not do so. In re Pio-
neer Mill Co., 53 Hawaii 496, 497 n.1, 497 P.2d 549, 551 n.1 (1972); 10 MooRE's, supra, at II-
3. Indeed, the Hawaii Supreme Court has expressly taken judicial notice of land ownership
in a case which rejected the State's claim to title. State v. Midkiff, 49 Hawaii 456, 460, 421
P.2d 550, 554 (1966) (judicial notice that Victoria Kamamalu inherited vast land from her
mother who died in 1839).
12 lolani Palace, now an historical landmark in Honolulu, was once the residence of Ha-
waii's monarchs.
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remedied than one based on substantive due process. Even if a federal
court were to find a denial of procedural due process, as in Brinkerhoff-
Faris, the proper relief would be to remand the case to the state court to
be redetermined under fair and adequate procedures. Thus, even assum-
ing procedural due process violations were committed in McBryde, the
federal district court could not substitute its own judgment on the sub-
stantive legal issues.
IV. EVEN ASSUMING THAT COURTS CAN "TAKE"-
THE COURT IN Robinson SHOULD HAVE REFUSED JURISDICTION
Suppose that all of the previous discussion is incorrect and that state
courts can "take" through their decisions. What then is the proper re-
sponse of a federal district court? In this section it is argued that even if
courts can take, the court in Robinson was compelled to refuse jurisdic-
tion. First, it is contended that the doctrine expressed in Rooker v. Fidel-
ity Trust Co.,125 that the lower federal courts have no power to review
state court decisions, deprives the federal court of jurisdiction. Second, it
is contended that res judicata barred the federal court from deciding the
Robinson case. Lastly, the question of whether a claim under 42 U.S.C.§
1983 (1976) constitutes an exception to these two rules is examined and
answered in the negative.
A. The Rooker Doctrine-Lack of Jurisdiction
One of the critical issues in Robinson is whether the facts of that case
fall within the rule set forth in Rooker v. Fidelty Trust Co., that the
lower federal courts have no jurisdiction to act as appellate courts of the
states. " As in Robinson, the plaintiff in Rooker was the losing party in a
... 263 U.S. 413 (1923).
126 Most recently, the district court applied Rooker principles to another Hawaii case.
Zimring v. County of Hawaii, Civ. No. 79-0054 (D. Hawaii, filed June 25, 1979). The contin-
uing vitality of the Rooker doctrine is also manifest in circuit court rulings. See, e.g., Wil-
liams v. Washington, 554 F.2d 369, 370, 371 (9th Cir. 1977) (section 1983 claimed barred by
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Rooker mentioned); Smiley v. South Dakota, 551 F.2d
774, 775 (8th Cir. 1977) (Rooker grounds; section 1983 claim noted); Adkins v. Underwood,
520 F.2d 890, 893 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1017 (1975) (section 1983 claim barred;
Rooker argued); Jack's Fruit Co. v. Growers Marketing Serv., 488 F.2d 493, 494 (5th Cir.
1973) (procedural due process claim barred by Rooker); Tang v. Appellate Div., 487 F.2d
138, 141 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 906 (1974) (section 1983 claim barred by
Rooker); Hutcherson v. Lehtin, 485 F.2d 567, 568-69 (9th Cir. 1973) (section 1983 claim
barred by Rooker; res judicata noted); Roy v. Jones, 484 F.2d 96, 99 n.11 (3d Cir. 1973)
(section 1983 action barred; Rooker noted); Francisco Enterprises, Inc. v. Kirby, 482 F.2d
481, 484 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 916 (1974) (section 1983 claim barred by
Rooker); Hanley v. Four Corners Vacation Properties, Inc., 480 F.2d 536, 538 (10th Cir.
1973) (procedural due process claim barred by Rooker); Duke v. Texas, 477 F.2d 244, 253
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state court proceeding. After an adverse decision in state court, he turned
around and sued in federal district court to set aside the state court judg-
ment. The district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme
Court affirmed saying:
Under the legislation of Congress, no court of the United States other than this
Court could entertain a proceeding to reverse or modify the judgment for er-
rors of that character .... To do so would be an exercise of appellate jurisdic-
tion. The jurisdiction possessed by the District Courts is strictly original.127
The Court reasoned that the lower federal courts have no power to act
as appellate courts in light of the fact that Congress has never granted
them that capacity.12 8 Section 25 of the First Judiciary Act 1 29 vested ap-
pellate review of state courts solely in the Supreme Court. Rooker was
only a logical derivation of the exclusiveness of Supreme Court review
under 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1976).13o As Professor David P. Currie argues, the
general federal question grants of jurisdiction embodied in 28 U.S.C. §§
1331 and 1343 (1976) should not be construed to undermine section
1257's exclusive grant of review to the Supreme Court, for granting fed-
eral district courts jurisdiction to review state court decisions would sub-
vert section 1257's requirement that an appeal to the Supreme Court be
timely filed.""' Moreover, federal district court review would undermine
section 1257's requirement that review be from the highest court of the
State." Robinson-type intervention, where a new trial is held, also would
be contrary to the Supreme Court's requirement that review of state deci-
sions be limited to the facts on the state court record.1 3 3 Professor Currie
states:
I suspect that the Supreme Court was chosen to review state court judgments
because only it had sufficient dignity to make federal review of state courts
(5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 978 (1974) (section 1983 claim barred on Younger and
Rooker grounds); Community Action Group v. City of Columbus, 473 F.2d 966, 973 (5th Cir.
1973) (constitutional claim barred under Rooker); Bricker v. Crane, 468 F.2d 1228, 1231-32
(lst Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 930 (1973) (section 1983 claim barred by res judicata
and Rooker); Paul v. Dade County, 419 F.2d 10, 13 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
1065 (1970) (freedom of religion claim barred by Rooker); Brown v. Chastain, 416 F.2d 1012,
1013 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 951 (1970) (due process and equal protection
claim barred by Rooker).
,17 263 U.S. at 416.
12 Id.
:29 Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 85.
"o See 263 U.S. at 416. The 1923 Rooker decision invoked section 237 of the amended
Judicial Code, see Act of Sept. 6, 1916, ch. 448, § 2, 39 Stat. 726. The current codification
was based on that section of the Judicial Code. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1976).
131 See 263 U.S. at 416; Currie, Res Judicata: The Neglected Defense, 45 U. Cm. L. REv.
317, 322-23 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Currie].
" See Currie, supra note 131, at 323.
11 Id. at 323-24.
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reasonably palatable; that the highest-state-court requirement was designed to
preclude federal interference unless and until state courts had a full opportu-
nity to avoid that clash; and that the time limits on Supreme Court review
were meant to protect parties prevailing in state courts from stale challenges to
their judgments. If any of these surmises is accurate, Rooker is right.'3 4
Petitioners in Robinson, of course, did not characterize their action as
an appeal or review of a state court judgment, but the form of the plead-
ings should not be allowed to prevail over what clearly was an appeal."8 5
As the Court said in Rooker, a litigant "cannot be permitted to do indi-
rectly what he no longer can do directly."
1 8
Although disguised as an original action, with State officials as the
"new" defendants and a "new" claim that the state court "took" their
property, the Robinson action was clearly an attempt to avoid the effects
of the McBryde state court determination. In essence, both sides are "ap-
pealing" to a different court. The ultimate issue in McBryde and Robin-
son was really the same - ownership of water rights. 8 7 The Rooker doc-
trine was therefore circumvented merely by naming those State officials
who must enforce a state court decree as the new defendants and then
claiming the federal suit was a new and original action.'" It is illogical to
suppose that the policies inherent in Rooker might be so easily
undermined.
The Rooker doctrine is merely another manner of expressing the idea
that courts cannot take and that state decisions which overrule prior law
do not create a substantive due process federal question."39 The difference
between the Rooker doctrine and res judicata is that Rooker is jurisdic-
tional and therefore need not be raised by the parties. The court can dis-
miss the action sua sponte. " g0 Thus, the court in Robinson should have
followed Rooker and dismissed on its own motion.
Id. at 323 (footnote omitted).
1I /d.
263 U.S. at 416.
137 See text accompanying notes 19-35, 40 supra.
13 Currie, supra note 131, at 333-34.
"' Since Rooker invalidates (as lacking jurisdiction) direct or indirect "disguised" appeals
of state court decisions, it thus also invalidates the federal question used to gain jurisdic-
tion. Two different ways of looking at this are: (1) Rooker held that a federal question can-
not be conjured in order to gain appellate jurisdiction of state cases; and (2) if a case is an
"indirect appeal" of a state decision, then the question used to gain jurisdiction is not "fed-
eral." Thus, if one can determine that the federal action is an attempt to appeal a state
action; that is, to avoid the direct consequences of a state decision, then the federal court
must dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Ergo, the question presented to the court - such as
the claim that the court "took" property - cannot be, by definition, a substantial federal
question.
110 Currie, supra note 131, at 324.
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B. Res Judicata
In his recent article, Professor Currie also reminds the reader of'the
often ignored use of res judicata to preclude relitigation of an action in
federal court subsequent to a state court determination.'" When the first
action is brought in state court and the second in federal court, the fed-
eral court is compelled to apply res judicata if the substantive res judicata
law of the state so requires. 42 Although discussing this point,"" the court
in Robinson did not mention a critically relevant federal statute, which
states:
[J]udicial proceedings [of any court of any ... State, Territory, or Possession]
... shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United
States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the
courts of such State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken.1 4 4
Thus, the court would have to act as if it were a Hawaii trial court and
apply res judicata if the law of Hawaii, as developed by the Hawaii Su-
preme Court, would so require.'4
Three initial objections might be raised against applying res judicata in
Robinson. First, it might be argued that the federal proceeding involved a
different action. Second, it might be asserted that res judicata does not
apply if the parties to the second, federal action are different from those
in the original, state action. Lastly, it may be argued that res judicata
should not apply to actions based on a section 1983 claim.'14 The first two
14 See id. at 325-50. The purpose of res judicata is to "bring an adjudication to a final
conclusion with a reasonable promptness and within reasonable limits of cost." F. JAMES &
G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE 530 (2d ed. 1977). The thrust of res judicata is a search for
some point of finality in litigation: "To litigate the same matter twice or more would impose
costs on the parties and the burdened and subsidized judicial system. Indeed, if a judgment
were not conclusive as to what it actually determined, 'the adjudicative process would fail to
serve its social function' of resolving disputes." Currie, supra note 131, at 325 (footnote
omitted).
:42 Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co., 309 U.S. 4 (1939).
,4 441 F. Supp. at 583-84 & n.35.
.4' 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1976).
145 The Hawaii Supreme Court has held that res judicata "precludes a second suit based
on the same cause of action involved in a prior suit between the same parties or their priv-
ies." Henderson v. Pence, 50 Hawaii 162, 163, 434 P.2d 309, 310 (1967). See Yuen v. London
Guarantee & Accident Co., 40 Hawaii 213, 223 (1953); text accompanying notes 120-21
supra.
'4s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976):
Civil action for deprivation of rights
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, custom, or usage, of any State
or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or im-
munities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
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arguments will be discussed in this subsection and the last in the follow-
ing subsection.
The first argument against applying res judicata in Robinson is that the
claim in the federal proceeding, namely, that the McBryde decision un-
constitutionaly took property, was truly different from the issue raised in
McBryde, a suit seeking a declaration of ownership interests. Assuming
that courts can take, one then must consider the legal defintion of a claim
in order to determine whether these are the same claims for res judicata
purposes. A claim includes all rights of the plaintiff to remedies against
the defendant with respect to all or any part of the transaction or series
of connected transactions out of which the action arose.1 4 7 Arguably, the
McBryde and Robinson actions are the same in that both arise out of the
same factual situation.1
48
In McBryde, the action was a declaration of ownership rights. In
Robinson, the allegedly new action sought a determination of whether the
state adjudication of ownership rights in McBryde was correct. In es-
sence, both cases concerned the same "ultimate practical question" ' 9 of
who owns the water rights. A different view could only be based on the
untenable argument that an appeal from a trial court is a different claim
from the claim brought before the trial court.
Secondly, it might be argued that because there are different parties in
McBryde and Robinson res judicata should not apply. 60 In McBryde the
suit was between McBryde Sugar Company and Gay & Robinson. In
Robinson, McBryde Sugar Company, Gay & Robinson, and others sued
State officials to enjoin the consequences of the McBryde decision. If Mc-
Bryde and Robinson do involve the same claim or ultimate practical
question, then to allow avoidance of res judicata by rearranging the par-
ties and adding defendants who are responsible for carrying out the origi-
nal decision would represent the triumph of form over substance. Peti-
tioners should not be allowed to escape the well-settled rule that the
binding effect of a judgment is defined by the law of the rendering juris-
diction.'6 ' Assuming that Robinson involves new parties, the McBryde de-
cision still governs the situation under the doctrine of collateral
estoppel. 58
If res judicata could be subverted so easily, then civil litigants who lose
at trial could eschew the appellate process by refiling their case in an-
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 71(1) (Tent. Draft No. 1 (1973)).
4 See note 40 supra.
14 Currie, supra note 131, at 341.
'" Id. at 331-34.
,5, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1976); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 94, 95
(1971).
," See, e.g., Parklane Hosiery, Inc. v. Shore, 99 S. Ct. 645 (1979) (collateral estoppel
proper even when it denies defendant a jury trial in a civil matter); Blonder-Tongue Labora-
tories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 (1971); Bernhard v. Bank of
America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 812, 122 P.2d 892, 894 (1942).
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other trial court and adding sheriffs or others responsible for enforcement
as new defendants. s Such evasion of the statutorily protected doctrine
of res judicata should not be tolerated by the federal courts.
C. The Section 1983 Exception
The last argument against applying res judicata in Robinson is a claim
that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) should constitute an exception to both the
Rooker doctrine and res judicata. Petitioners in Robinson sought federal
jurisdiction based on claims arising under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). That section essentially provides private parties le-
gal or equitable redress for deprivations of federal constitutional or statu-
tory civil rights by persons acting under color of state law.
In effect, petitioners claimed that threatened enforcement of the Mc-
Bryde decision would constitute a taking in violation of the fifth amend-
ment. Since the justices of the Hawaii Supreme Court were not named as
defendants in the complaint, they were not technically the "person",
within the section 1983 context, who had allegedly deprived petitioners of
their rights. Since the State had not attempted to enforce the McBryde
decision, there was no way to know whether the State's action would con-
stitute a taking. It was really the action of the Hawaii Supreme Court in
McBryde that provided the only logical basis for the complaint. Absent
the McBryde decision there would have been no reason to seek a declara-
tory judgment on the taking issue and to seek an injunction against fu-
ture, albeit undefined, state enforcement. Thus, although the supreme
court was not named as a defendant, only its conduct could form the ba-
sis for a section 1983 claim.
Therefore, the same objections to the assertion of federal question ju-
risdiction apply to jurisdiction under section 1983. If there is no fifth
amendment claim based on the decision, there is no section 1983 claim. If
the State were threatening to act in a manner that constitutes a taking of
petitioners' rights without just compensation, then petitioners may have
had a legitimate 1983 claim. However, there was no indication that the
State was about to act in a confiscatory manner.
Petitioners and the court in Robinson assumed that the mere declara-
tion of ownership in the State by virtue of the McBryde decision consti-
tuted a confiscatory act. This is not necessarily true. The term "owner-
ship," without clarification, is meaningless in water rights."' Ownership
"I For example, in a suit X v. Y, X loses a money judgment decision to Y. X brings suit
against the sheriffs charged with executing the judgment in another trial court. The suit is
called X v. Sheriffs. Is this a new action or just an appeal of the original decision? Should
res judicata be denied by the second trial court simply because new parties have been ad-
ded? Obviously not!
,54 See Trelease, Government Ownership and Trusteeship of Water, 45 CAL. L. Rev. 638
(1957) [hereinafter cited as Trelease] (discussion of various meanings associated with State
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of water by the State, as evidenced in most other jurisdictions asserting
ownership, simply means that the State has the power to control and reg-
ulate the waters if it chooses to do so at all. 5 ' Hence, the issue of confis-
cation was not ripe.156 Life on the Hanapepe River goes on as before. If
the State chose to control and regulate the water in such a manner as to
completely prevent petitioners from using the water, such conduct might
constitute a confiscatory act for which fifth amendment protection could
be invoked. At that point a suit to determine whether a taking has oc-
curred would be more appropriate. Until then, the injunction in Robinson
is a suit to enjoin undefined state action.
Moreover, the power of the State to control and regulate the waters
does not depend on the declaration in McBryde that the State is the own-
er of the water. Rather, the power to control and regulate is derived from
the inherent police power of the State.'57 Thus, the State was not given
anything under McBryde, nor was anything taken from petitioners. There
is a possibility of a taking under future regulation, but the issue was not
ripe in Robinson.
Without the threat of tangible governmental action which may consti-
tute a taking, there was no controversy and no section 1983 action over
the so-called ownership issue. The Robinson suit is simply an action to
prevent unspecified government control and regulation of water. Once it
is agreed that the State inherently has the power to regulate waters in a
manner that does not constitute a taking, there is no controversy left.
The Robinson action is then reduced to an action similar to an overly
broad suit against a state to enjoin any and all control or regulation of
land through zoning. Such an injunction can only be sought against par-
ticularized state conduct. 58
"ownership" of water: res nullius, res communes, publici juris, and res publicae); text ac-
companying notes 175-76 infra.
See id. at 640-45.
'" In other words, the taking issue may have been purely hypothetical and thus not a
case or controversy under article III of the Constitution. See ILWU Local 37 v. Boyd, 347
U.S. 222 (1954); United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 89-91 (1947).
157 See, e.g., HAWAII CONST. art. IX, § 1, art. XI, §§ 1, 7. Prior to ratification of constitu-
tional amendments in 1978, similar police powers were explicitly recognized in the constitu-
tion. See id. art. VIII, § 1 (1968, renumbered art. IX, § 1, 1978); id. art. X, § 1 '(1968,
amended and renumbered art. XI, § 1, 1978).
"' Plaintiffs arguably did not prove the real or threatened harm necessary to support the
injunction. Cf. Massachusetts State Grange v. Benton, 272 U.S. 525, 527 (1926) ("[N]o in-
junction ought to issue against officers of a State clothed with authority to enforce the law
in question, unless in a case reasonably free from doubt and when necessary to prevent great
and irreparable injury."). Plaintiff's suit in Robinson was based on the assumption that the
McBryde decision granted fee-simple-like res publicae ownership to the State and that the
State planned to confiscate waters presently used by the sugar companies and sell it back to
them. Reading McBryde in the context of water rights law in general does not sustain the
assumption of res publicae ownership. See Trelease, supra note 154. Upon viewing the fu-
ture plans of the State in terms of water management, the perceived threat of "sale" also
was not reasonable. See STATE WATER COMM'N, HAWAII'S WATER RESOURCES, DIRECTIONS FOR
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Assuming, however, that a valid section 1983 claim existed, it is neces-
sary to consider whether the statutory action provides an exception to res
judicata. A number of commentators have suggested that, because of the
strong federal policy underlying section 1983, prior state court determina-
tions should not be res judicata as to later federal court proceedings. 59
The Supreme Court has not ruled on this issue. The majority of lower
federal courts have held that res judicata applies."'0 In other words, in the
view of these courts, section 1983 does not create an exception to the stat-
utory requirement that federal courts give full faith and credit to state
court judgments.161
The court in Robinson viewed the res judicata issue in slightly different
terms. According to the court, petitioners' action should not be barred by
res judicata because it was not raised and could not have been raised by
parties in the McBryde proceeding. 6 ' There is disagreement within and
among the circuits as to whether section 1983 claims which were not
raised in the state proceedings are barred in the federal proceedings."6 3
THE FUTURE, A REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR (1979) (discussing and proposing a permit system
to manage the use of water resources but not the sale of water to raise state revenues). Thus
the perceived harm in Robinson was based on two unfounded assumptions.
'" See Averitt, Federal Section 1983 Actions After State Court Judgment, 44 U. CoLo.
L. REV. 191 (1972); McCormack, Federalism and § 1983: Limitations on Judicial Enforce-
ment of Constitutional Claims (pt. II), 60 VA. L. REV. 250 (1974); Developments in the Law
- Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1133 (1977). For a contrary view and an
excellent analysis, see Currie, supra note 131.
' Ten circuits have applied res judicata to subsequent section 1983 actions. See Davis v.
Towe, 526 F.2d 588 (4th Cir. 1975) (mem.); Blankner v. City of Chicago, 504 F.2d 1037 (7th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 948 (1975); Mastracchio v. Ricci, 498 F.2d 1257 (1st Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 909 (1975); Thistlethwaite v. City of New York, 497 F.2d 339
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1093 (1974); Roy v. Jones, 484 F.2d 96 (3d Cir. 1973); Fran-
cisco Enterprises, Inc. v. Kirby, 482 F.2d 481 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 916
(1974); Metros v. United States Dist. Ct., 441 F.2d 313 (10th Cir. 1971); Coogan v. Cincin-
nati Bar Ass'n, 431 F.2d 1209 (6th Cir. 1970); Brown v. Chastain, 416 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 951 (1970); Norwood v. Parenteau, 228 F.2d 148 (8th Cir. 1955),
cert. denied, 351 U.S. 955 (1956). These cases are cited in Currie, supra note 131, at 332
n.106.
," See text accompanying note 144 supra. For further discussion, see Currie, supra note
131, at 327-32.
' 441 F. Supp. at 584 n.35: "[P]laintiffs claimed wrong in this federal action was not
within any of the issues raised and tried. . . . No party including the State could have an-
ticipated what the Supreme Court did, sua sponte .. .. The Supreme Court refused to
allow plaintiffs to argue the constitutional issues raised by this federal action."
163 Circuit courts have differed as to the res judicata effect to be accorded a state court
judgment in federal court when the constitutional claim is asserted in federal court but was
not raised in state court. Compare Scoggin v. Schrunk, 522 F.2d 436 (9th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1066 (1976) (res judicata is a bar), with Lombard v. Board of Educ., 502
F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 976 (1975) (res judicata is not a bar).
The confusion among courts as to the general applicability of res judicata to section 1983
claims was noted by the Sixth Circuit in Getty v. Reed, 547 F.2d 971 (6th Cir. 1977):
If what we have said thus far suggests that the District Judge who held he had "no
jurisdiction" to try this case simply missed the signs on a well marked trial [sic], we
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Although the Ninth Circuit held in Scoggin v. Schrunk114 that res judi-
cata bars the unasserted federal claim, dicta from a recent case indicates
that the Ninth Circuit's view may be changing where there is a clearly
enunciated federal interest to be protected. 6 5
In any event, petitioners in Robinson argued 6 6 that their case
presented an even more sympathetic factual situation than Scoggin:16 7
The section 1983 action could not have been brought in McBryde because
it was allegedly created by the decision itself. Thus, we are back on the
same circular path. If the constitutionality of the state decision creates a
claim and if section 1983 creates an exception to res judicata, then every
state court decision potentially can be relitigated in federal court under
section 1983 with no possibility of res judicata applying. The federal
courts would become the appellate courts of the states through the use of
section 1983.
The fallacy which creates this circularity of reasoning is the misconcep-
tion that a decision creates a new claim. The correctness of a decision
(and the constitutionality of a decision is only one aspect of its correct-
ness) is not a new claim but only an aspect of the original claim, which is
hasten to acknowledge that no such thing is true. One commentator, Theis, has noted
that the Supreme Court has given no guidance as to claim preclusion by final state court
decision in § 1983 cases and added that as a result "the decisions of the lower courts
teem with inconsistencies." Theis appended the following footnote to illustrate his point:
Compare Thistlethwaite v. City of New York, 497 F.2d 339 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1093 (1974), with Lombard v. Board of Educ., 502 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 976 (1974) [sic]; Roy v. Jones, 484 F.2d 96 (3d Cir. 1973), with
Kauffman v. Moss, 420 F.2d 1270 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 846 (1970); Brown
v. Chastain, 416 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1969), with Mack v. Florida State Bd. of Den-
tistry, 430 F. 2d 862 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 960 (1971) (White, J.,
dissenting from denial of writ); Coogan v. Cincinnati Bar Ass'n, 431 F.2d 1209 (6th
Cir. 1970), with Mulligan v. Schlacter [Schlachter], 389 F.2d 231 (6th Cir. 1968);
Blankner v. City of Chicago, 504 F.2d 1037 (7th Cir. 1974), with Hampton v. City of
Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 606 n.4 (7th Cir. 1973); Francisco Enterprises, Inc. v. Kirby,
482 F.2d 481 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 916 (1974), with Ney v. Califor-
nia, 439 F.2d 1285 (9th Cir. 1971).
Id. at 975 (parallel citations omitted). Obviously, if there are differences within single cir-
cuits, there are differences between the circuits. Getty considered federal jurisdiction over
section 1983 claims within the narrow context of the three-judge-court statute, 28 U.S.C. §
2281 (1970) (repealed 1976), see 547 F.2d at 972, and found that res judicata was no bar to
the procedural due process claims.
522 F.2d 436 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1066 (1976) (res judicata bars a
claimed due process violation in federal court on grounds of failure to notify homeowners of
delinquent installment payments and the resultant sale of property even though the federal
constitutional claim was not asserted in state court where the purchaser sought to nullify
the conveyance on the basis of unjust enrichment and lack of notice).
16' Red Fox v. Red Fox, 564 F.2d 361, 365 (9th Cir. 1977) (unique historical relationship
between American Indians and the Federal Government).
166 See Answering Brief for McBryde Sugar Co., at 53-59, Robinson v. Ariyoshi, Civ. No.
78-2264 (9th Cir., filed Nov. 28, 1978).
167 The district court found Scoggin inapposite. 441 F. Supp. at 584 n.35. See note 164
supra for a brief description of Scoggin.
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properly reviewed only on appeal. If one accepts the view that a decision
creates an action (that courts can take) and that an action based on sec-
tion 1983 is not subject to res judicata because it could not have been
raised previously, then the policies expressed under the Rooker doctrine
are substantially undermined, and the exclusiveness of review by the
United States Supreme Court is negated.
The Rooker principle ' should not be subject to a section 1983 excep-
tion for the same reasons that res judicata should prevail. Without a clear
indication from Congress, section 1983 should not be read to undercut
section 1257 and that section's clear grant of exclusive review of state
court decisions to the Supreme Court. Analogies between section 1983
and habeas corpus fail because Congress intended through habeas corpus
to give federal district courts the power to collaterally attack state
judgments.16 9
It cannot be denied, however, that there may be a section 1983 action
arising out of the procedural manner in which courts act. If a litigant
were denied an opportunity to be heard, this could constitute a proper
claim. However, it must be noted that the proper remedy is to compel the
forum to adequately consider the argument. The proper remedy is not to
invalidate the substantive aspects of the decision. The distinction
between fifth and fourteenth amendment considerations remains critical.
Courts can act to deprive persons of fourteenth amendment procedural
due process but not fifth amendment substantive due process. The valid-
ity of section 1983 claims based on procedural due process would depend
on the same considerations discussed in the preceding Part III. Thus,
even if it is assumed that a section 1983 action exists in Robinson, it is
certainly not so clear as the court implied17 0 that the Rooker doctrine or
res judicata do not defeat federal district court jurisdiction.
V. CONCLUSION
If there is a lesson to be learned from examining Robinson v. Ariyoshi,
it is that courts cannot take. It is not that they cannot take property
because they cannot act in a manner which has the same results or ramifi-
cations of a governmental taking. Rather, they do not take because the
implications of the contrary proposition contradict the essential functions
of the judiciary. Simply put, courts do not take because that would de-
stroy their ability to resolve disputes. Courts do not take; they declare. If
168 See note 126 supra and accompanying text.
169 See Currie, supra note 131, at 323 n.50. Cf. Note, Federal Relief Against Threatened
State Prosecutions: The Implications of Younger, Lake Carriers and Roe, 48 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 965 (1973) (availability of federal habeas relief precludes prosecution under a statute
held by a local federal court to be unconstitutional).
17' The court did not discuss Rooker. It disposed of the res judicata defense at 441 F.
Supp. at 583-84.
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courts were said to take, they could not effectively declare.
The ramifications of the Robinson theory of intervention are enormous
not only for the state courts but for federal courts as well. If a decision
can create an independent federal claim, then federal trial courts could
enjoin United States circuit court decisions involving "unexpected" re-
suits. 7 1 The implications of Robinson-type intervention are that there
would be no judicial hierarchy and no finality in appellate systems.
When it comes to writing an epitaph for Robinson v. Ariyoshi as it con-
cerns Hawaii water rights, one might fittingly pirate the title: "Much Ado
About Nothing." Since the claim was based on the unjustified assumption
that "ownership" in McBryde was used in the res publicae sense, the
Robinson litigation seems to have been a waste of resources.172
Rather than seeking an injunction in the Robinson action, the petition-
ers more sensibly should have waited for the taking issue to ripen.17 3 This
ripening might occur if (1) the State were to adopt and implement a
water regulatory scheme that was overly restrictive with respect to the
petitioners' rights to use; or (2) pending a clarification by the court, the
State took interim action to prevent actual use of water by the petitioners
or to charge them for its use. 7 Any of these possibilities would at least
provide the federal district court with a concrete state action to review.
Instead, the court prematurely judged the meaning of McBryde, thereby
provoking the very kind of situation that jurisprudential considerations of
ripeness are designed to forestall.
It will not become clear what the Hawaii Supreme Court really meant
until that court speaks again. Nevertheless, one can attempt to examine
McBryde in the same light that one looks at landmark decisions which
leave certain questions unanswered. Toward this end, a few closing obser-
vations are offered.
The primary holding of the court in McBryde was that the State is the
owner of all water not subject to appurtenant or riparian rights. What
does this mean? Twenty years ago, Professor Frank J. Trelease wrote an
' Moreover, the important consideration of finality in the judicial system would be de-
stroyed. For example, the Robinson court took jurisdiction based on the concept that the
McBryde decision took the property rights of the petitioners. If courts can take, could the
State sue in state court to enjoin the federal officials responsible for enforcing Robinson on
the same theory that the Robinson decision took their property rights as created by the
McBryde decision? Since state trial courts can entertain federal constitutional issues, partic-
ularly section 1983 actions, the state court could conceivably assume jurisdiction, void the
Robinson decision, and enjoin the federal officials from enjoining McBryde. Then, suppose
that subsequent to this state court's decision a federal trial court similarly assumes jurisdic-
tion to enjoin the state trial court's decision enjoining Robinson. The result would be an
absurdity.
" See notes 176-79 infra and accompanying text.
178 See notes 154-58 supra and accompanying text.
74 None of these events would necessarily constitute a taking. The point made here is
merely that, in contrast to the situation in Robinson, these occurrences would enhance the
ripeness of any claim that might be brought for adjudication.
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article equating the concept of ownership of water with that of tu-tu. 7h
Tu-tu is the label that a tribe of south-sea islanders gave to one's status
after contacting one's mother-in-law. If an islander encountered his
mother-in-law, he was subject to a dangerous force or infection that could
ruin his whole community. Professor Trelease drew the analogy between
tu-tu and ownership of water in the following manner:
Civilized Americans, of course, know that there is no such thing as tu-tu. As
the prevalence of mother-in-law jokes testifies, people encounter their mothers-
in-law often and nothing like this happens. Therefore, tu-tu does not exist in
fact, it has no reference to reality. While it might be argued that tu-tu has
reality to the islanders, it can be demonstrated that even they can get along
very well without the concept. They say "If a man encounters his mother-in-
law, he becomes tu-tu. When a man is tu-tu, he must be purified." But all
reference to tu-tu may be eliminated and the same result reached by simply
saying "If a man encounters his mother-in-law he must be purified."
An examination of the legal concept of ownership shows that it falls into this
pattern. "I bought this watch, therefore I have ownership of it. I have owner-
ship of this watch, therefore I may recover it from one who takes it from me."
Just as we eliminated tu-tu, we can eliminate the middle concept entirely: "I
bought this watch, therefore I may recover it from one who takes it from me."
The author suggests that we may substitute "tu-tu" for "ownership," or, if we
prefer, "green cheese," and the logic is unimpaired. 76
Since ownership is essentially tu-tu, one can give it nearly any meaning
one chooses. Thus, State ownership in McBryde may be given a noncon-
fiscatory interpretation. Ownership may mean publici juris, belonging to
the State in the sense that the State is the representatives of the public
to enforce the public interest.
Most fears derived from the McBryde decision impute the res publi-
cae17 7 meaning to ownership; that is, ownership in a corporeal sense, in
the manner that the State owns Iolani Palace. However, it is unusual to
view water rights in this way. For example, Wyoming attempted to use
res publicae in its constitution, and it was subsequently interpreted by
the courts to mean a trust or regulatory sense.17 8 In the McBryde decision
itself, the court attempted to avoid the res publicae definition and to em-
ploy a public trust sense of the term.'7 Moreover, there is nothing partic-
M Trelease, supra note 154, at 638 (citing Ross, Tu-tu, 70 HARv. L. REV. 812 (1957)).
176 Id.
177 Id. at 640 (defining res publicae).
173 Willey v. Decker, 11 Wyo. 496, 73 P. 210 (1903); Farm Inv. Co. v. Carpenter, 9 Wyo.
110, 61 P. 258 (1900).
171 54 Hawaii at 186, 504 P.2d at 1338:
We believe that the right to water is one of the most important usufruct [sic] of lands,
and it appears clear to us that by the foregoing limitation the right to water was specifi-
cally and definitely reserved for the people of Hawaii for their common good in all of the
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ularly desirable about ownership of water in a res publicae sense. The
purpose of State ownership would be to facilitate control and regulation.
The State can achieve those ends through the use of its police power""o
and does not have to rely on judicial declaration. If one interprets owner-
ship as giving the owner the power of control and not a proprietary mean-
ing, then the McBryde decision has not given the State anything new.
Hence, it is difficult to conceive of water having been taken from the
petitioners.
Even if the court in McBryde had intended ownership in the res publi-
cae sense, the court may not have meant to deny the parties the right to
continued use of water. One need only look to the recent Hawaii Supreme
Court decision in United Congregational & Evangelical Churches v.
Heirs of Kamamalul s ' for an example of the majority's extraordinary
willingness to protect the property interests of a party whose claim of
land title was nonetheless rejected. In that case, plaintiff churches
brought an action to quiet title. The court ruled that the State held title
to the land at issue, but the special facts of longstanding use of the par-
cels by the plaintiff under a good faith claim of right created an equitable
right to continued use of the land for religious purposes. ' ss The equitable
land grants. [footnote omitted]
280 See note 157 supra and accompanying text.
181 59 Hawaii 334, 582 P.2d 208 (1978).
282 Id. at 343, 582 P.2d at 214. In United Congregational, a bare majority of the Hawaii
Supreme Court (even then, only two of the majority votes were held by Supreme Court
Justices, since Circuit Judge Shintaku replaced Justice Menor who was disqualified) appears
to have created a new interest in real property, an interest characterized as "an equitable
right akin to a prescriptive easement." Id. at 338, 582 P.2d at 211. The suit arose as an
action by United Churches to quiet title to two parcels of land in Holualoa and Kahalu'u
ahupua'a on the Island of Hawaii. Only the defendant-intervenor State of Hawaii disputed
title to the land and appealed from a trial court judgment for the United Churches.
The lands involved as part of the ahupua'a, were maheled to Victoria Kamamalu in 1848.
Title was conveyed in 1852 but with boundaries of the parcels not defined. The Holualoa
and Kahalu'u lots were separately surveyed in 1854, subsequently recorded in the Land
Book of the Department of Public Instruction as a "School lot" and "School and Church
lot", respectively, and granted to the Board of Education by Royal Patent in 1882. Actual
school uses continued only between 1880 and 1888. The trial court found that the United
Churches had used the lots continuously for over a hundred years exclusively for church
purposes, except for the brief period of school use. The trial court ruled in favor of the
United Churches based on a two-step theory: (1) Any government title to the lots was lost
by operation of a reverter statute which returned the lots to Kamamalu, the original gran-
tor, when school uses ended in 1888; and (2) the United Churches acquired title from
Kamamalu by adverse possession.
The majorlty's rejection of this theory reflected its interpretation of the operation of the
reverter statute and its view that private school and church uses were inextricable in 19th
century Hawaii. The 1854 survey presumptively evidenced a grant to the Government in fee
simple absolute for school and church purposes. An 1859 statute and a successor 1864 stat-
ute diminished the Government's interest to fee simple determinable by providing for re-
verter to the "original grantor" if the school and church uses ceased, but the reverter provi-
sion was repealed in 1896. The majority found that the reverter provision was never
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principles dictating United Churches may provide a basis for longtime
agricultural users of water to seek analogous results. McBryde never ad-
triggered. While the school uses ended in 1888, the church uses continued after the repeal of
the reverter provision, and the court ruled that reverter required discontinuance of both
school and church purposes. Continuance of the church uses meant that government title
ripened to fee simple absolute with repeal of the reverter statute in 1896.
The majority noted that adverse possession cannot run against the sovereign, id. at 341-
42, 582 P.2d at 213 (citing State v. Zimring, 52 Hawaii 477, 479 P.2d 205 (1970)), but said
that "the doctrine of a presumed lost grant, arising out of adverse, exclusive, and uninter-
rupted possession for a substantial number of years, may be applied against the sovereign."
Id. (citing United States v. Fullard-Leo, 331 U.S. 256 (1947); In re Kioloku, 25 Hawaii 357
(1920)). Nevertheless, the court was constrained by the facts to agree with the trial court
that any presumption of a lost grant of title had been rebutted. The presumption was rebut-
ted by (1) the explicit Royal Patent grants of 1882, (2) a 1911 church application requesting
grant of the Kahalu'u lot, and (3) statements by church officers that title was in the
government.
The majority concluded, however, that the circumstances did not rebut a presumption of
a lost grant of lesser rights, noting that in the law of prescriptive easements a lost grant of
easements may be presumed. Id. (citing Lalakea v. Hawaiian Irrigation Co., 36 Hawaii 692,
706 (1944)). The 1944 decision on which the majority relied had elaborated on acquiring
title to an easement by prescription based on the theory of lost grant:
Title to an easement such as claimed by the defendant upon and over the kuleana may
be acquired in two ways: 1. By grant. 2. By prescription. . . . By prescription, is by use
and occupation for the period prescribed by law adverse to the true owner of the fee.
Such use and occupation are substituted for the grant. In other words, they give rise to
the presumption that a grant existed, since lost or destroyed by time or accident.
To give rise to the presumption of a grant, the use and occupation of the easement
must be long, continued, uninterrupted and peaceable . . . . The longer the period the
stronger the presumption.
Lalakea v. Hawaiian Irrigation Co., 36 Hawaii 692, 706 (1944) (citations omitted).
The court analogized to presumed lost grants of easements and invoked principles of eq-
uity to allow continued use by the churches.
In furtherance of basic considerations of justice and equity, and by analogy with the law
regarding presumed lost grants of easements, we hold that the United Churches possess
equitable rights in the lots for religious and educational purposes, until such uses are
abandoned. The State, as holder of the title, is free to use and develop the lots so long as
the State does not interfere substantially with religious and educational uses by the
churches.
59 Hawaii at 344, 582 P.2d at 214. The evidence cited as establishing longstanding occupa-
tion by the churches under a good faith claim of right was: (1) Continuous use since mid-
19th century; (2) a 1912 petition to incorporate, approved by the territory which listed the
lots as property held; (3) a 1939 warranty deed from the churches' parent organization to
the county granting a portion of the Kahalu'u parcel for road widening; (4) a 1948 letter
from the Commissioner of Public Lands to a third party saying the Holualoa lot belonged to
the churches' parent organization; (5) testimony by a pastor that tax maps in the early
1960's showed the lots under the name of the parent organization; and (6) testimony by the
pastor that "the people" had told him, "We owned the lots since the early 1880's." Id. at
342-43, 582 P.2d at 213.
The two dissenting votes were cast by Justices Kidwell and Kobayashi (both since retired)
who were sympathetic to the equities involved but found no legal grounds to uphold a claim
by the United Churches. They objected that an equitable right akin to a prescriptive ease-
ment is a nonentity in property law whose substantive meaning and legal impact were left
undefined by the majority. The dissent reasoned that the circumstances which the majority
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dressed the possible rights to continued use or to compensation, so those
matters remain unanswered questions. It is clear from United Churches,
at least, that the court is not hostile to private property rights, notwith-
standing the view of the court in Robinson.
The second important ruling in the McBryde opinion, that water rights
are held only as appurtenant to land and that water cannot be trans-
ported beyond those lands,1 83 is more difficult to evaluate. If it is true, as
petitioners assert in Robinson, that the question of severability and trans-
portability of water was not before the court in McBryde, then the court's
ruling on these matters was dicta and arguably does not affect the parties
before the court; neither does the ruling create positive law. In other
words, McBryde did not make the transport of water illegal. In a proper
case, the court might say that certain landowners, perhaps those adjacent
to streams, have a common law right to prevent transportation of water
by others out of the watershed. Thus, the transportation of water might
be prevented by those who have standing to assert that right.'8 Resolu-
tion of this issue is not apparent from the decision.
Uncertainty in the aftermath of any major case is not unusual.'83 The
problems of creating a system of water law through judicial interpretation
and reinterpretation are obvious. It may take years of litigation to place
another water case before the supreme court. The nature of the judicial
process limits courts to resolving one narrow issue at a time. The Mc-
Bryde decision evidences the problems engendered when a court speaks
too broadly. All of these factors point to the desirability of a legislative
solution, a comprehensive water law for adjudicating rights. But water
legislation would not address the broader significance of this litigation.
This article has focused upon Robinson and the validity of its assertion
of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction was based on an eminently logical lay view of
a taking, a view which conflicts with the larger constitutional framework
by distorting fifth amendment values beyond their functional limits. The
search for every available legal doctrine to protect individuals from a gov-
ernment which may act in an arbitrary or capricious manner under vague
notions of the public interest should be encouraged. But in its attempt to
protect the individual, the court in Robinson, perhaps unknowingly, tread
upon some of the delicate checks and balances between federal and state
courts created by the Constitution.
found sufficient to rebut the presumption of a lost grant of title should equally rebut a
presumption of a lost grant of the equitable right.
,81 54 Hawaii at 191, 504 P.2d at 1341.
'' See note 38 supra.
185 Landmark decisions often leave unanswered questions. The long history of litigation
seeking to clarify and define the limits of Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) is
but one example. See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Milliken
v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973); Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Green v. New Kent County School
Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
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Ours is a system of federalism. One needs to be reminded how grudg-
ingly the States gave power to the Federal Government. They did not
readily acquiesce in Supreme Court review of state decisions. 86 Moreover,
the States and Congress have never given the lower federal courts the
general appellate power to review state decisions. 8 7 At this time in our
history, with the concerns articulated by some regarding state court inad-
equacy188 and with the increasing intervention of federal courts into state
actions, 89 it is easy to forget that state and federal systems were born
equal, with the Supreme Court as the highest court of review for both
systems. 90 Although the principle may become blurred by the apparent
power of federal courts, the state courts are still paramount and sovereign
on matters of state law. Even the Supreme Court is bound to respect this
tenet.' 91
If state courts are indeed sovereign on issues of state law, then state
supreme court decisions on those matters are final, subject only to review
by the High Court. They are not, to quote Justice Jackson, "final because
.. . [they] are infallible, but . . .infallible only because . . .[they] are
final."' 92 It is not the scope of this article to determine whether McBryde
was correctly decided, but to urge that the decision was final after the
Supreme Court denied review.
Although interpretation of McBryde is difficult, the decision is never-
theless a valid expression of state judicial sovereignty in the substantive
area of water law. Whether the decision is judged a consistent interpreta-
tion of prior law, it is the principle of state judicial sovereignty that as-
sures McBryde of its claim to legitimacy.
I" H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEMS 445 (2d ed.
1973).
117 See Stolz, Federal Review of State Court Decisions of Federal Questions: The Need
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